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Although family law is very much concerned with legal parentage and its attendant rights, children are much more
concerned with maintaining relationships with those who
care for them, regardless of whether that person is a legal
parent or someone functioning as one. What happens though
if the child’s legal parent attempts to banish the quasi-parent from the child’s life? Doing so can be extremely damaging to the child. Nonetheless, parents do possess a constitutional right to make decisions about how to rear their
children, including who may have access to the child.
Trying to strike a balance between protecting the child and
safeguarding the parent’s right is a daunting task. The
Supreme Court has provided little guidance on this issue,
having written only one opinion on the subject, Troxel v.
Granville, that only obliquely deals with the subject of quasiparenthood. Still, the states have relied on Troxel to craft a
number of different approaches to the challenging question
of quasi-parenthood.
As Troxel nears its twentieth anniversary, however, a problem has emerged. In implementing Troxel, the states have by
and large treated the traditional nuclear family model as
normative, using it to create a “law of quasi-parenthood.”
This approach is problematic for two reasons. First, since
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Troxel was decided, the composition of the “nuclear family”
has drastically changed. From the legalization of same-sex
marriage to the increase in divorce, cohabitation, and remarriage, fewer and fewer children are raised by their two
legal parents. Second, for a significant portion of the American population, including racial and ethnic minorities, the
nuclear family model has never represented the typical family structure, with children often being reared by members of
the extended family.
By premising the law of quasi-parenthood on the outdated
and unrealistic nuclear family model, more and more children do not receive the protections that the law of quasiparenthood was intended to provide. This Article traces the
history of quasi-parenthood, analyzing how the law has
evolved into a current practice that is, much to the harm of
American children, both shortsighted and underinclusive.
The Article concludes with concrete suggestions for change—
changes that will hopefully spur a legal standard for quasiparenthood that is less discriminatory and more reflective of
the contemporary American family.
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INTRODUCTION
The Constitution cannot be interpreted . . . to tolerate
the imposition by government upon the rest of us of
white suburbia’s preference in patterns of family living.
– Justice Brennan, Moore v. City of East Cleveland

To understand the concept of quasi-parentage, consider the
story of Ephraim, who was born in 1990 to unmarried parents,
Jon and Susan. 1 Susan subsequently married another man,
Phillip, and together they raised Ephraim until Susan’s untimely death in 2003. Prior to his mother’s death, Ephraim did
not know his biological father. Although Phillip never legally
adopted his stepson, Ephraim nonetheless considered Phillip
his father given that Phillip was “the only father figure
[Ephraim] had ever known.” 2 When it became clear that his
mother’s death entitled Ephraim, now an adolescent, to Social
Security benefits, Jon reemerged and sought custody of the
child he had essentially abandoned for the first twelve years of
his life. Phillip counterclaimed, seeking custody of Ephraim.
The state court, despite finding that “Jon was mostly absent
from Ephraim’s life until Susan died,” 3 awarded custody to
Jon. 4 It did so in light of the state’s “presumption in favor of
child custody with a biological parent as against an unrelated
third party.” 5 At no point did the court consider the harm to
Ephraim that would result—on the heels of losing his mother—
from having the man he had always considered his father removed from his life.
Cases like Ephraim’s are by no means unusual, and neither are the kinds of family arrangements that give rise to such
fact patterns. 6 Indeed, the people who actually function as a
child’s parents can change over the child’s life 7—a phenomenon

1. See State ex rel. Ephraim H. v. Jon P., No. A-04-1488, 2005 WL 2347727
(Neb. Ct. App. Sept. 27, 2005).
2. Id. at *1.
3. Id. at *3.
4. Id. at *4.
5. Id. at *3.
6. See infra Part III; Section I.A.
7. See infra Part I.
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one scholar refers to as “mid-life parental switches.” 8 Of course,
quasi-parenthood as a legal phenomenon has a long history in
the United States. Long before the Supreme Court would even
begin to weigh in on the constitutional dimensions of parenthood, 9 a number of state courts had dealt with claims by quasiparents. 10
A quasi-parent is generally defined as “a person not a legal
parent who nonetheless has greater rights in a contest with the
legal parent than does any other third party.” 11 Although this
Article uses the term quasi-parent, courts have described these
individuals using a variety of terms, including psychological
parent, in loco parentis, de facto parent, and parent by estoppel. And, just as courts have employed different terminology,
they have also used different standards for determining when
and to what extent nonlegal “parents” can gain parental rights
to children they have helped raise.
Much of this lack of uniformity stems from the uncertainty
courts face when balancing the rights of the quasi-parent with
those of the legal parents. Although the Supreme Court has labeled the right of parents to direct their child’s upbringing as
“fundamental,” 12 in practice it has not applied typical fundamental-rights analysis to state action interfering with the parent’s right to direct their child’s uprbringing. 13 But, if strict
scrutiny does not apply to all state interference with the parent-child relationship, what is the appropriate standard? And,
more to the point, when can the state confer rights typically associated with parenthood upon individuals who are not the
child’s legal parents? Or, if the standard is in fact strict scrutiny, might the state nonetheless have a compelling justifica8. Emily Buss, “Parental” Rights, 88 VA. L. REV. 635, 676 (2002) (“In these
cases, a child classically lives with one or both biological parents for some period
of her life, but at some point, others assume much or all of the parents’ child
rearing responsibilities.”).
9. See infra notes 233–242 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 218–229 and accompanying text.
11. Jennifer S. Hendricks, Essentially a Mother, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN &
L. 429, 458 (2007).
12. Chris Watkins, Comment, Beyond Status: The Americans with Disabilities
Act and the Parental Rights of People Labeled Developmentally Disabled or
Mentally Retarded, 83 CALIF. L. REV. 1415, 1431 (1995) (“For the past sixty-five
years, the Supreme Court has maintained that parental rights are ‘fundamental’
and that they should receive heightened protection from state regulation through
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.”).
13. See infra notes 259–266 and accompanying text.
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tion to limit parental rights in the face of competing claims by a
quasi-parent? Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has not answered these questions. 14 To the contrary, what little guidance
the Court has provided on this subject has only further complicated the issue.
In 2000, the Court issued its first and only case touching
on the rights of third parties vis-á-vis legal parents. 15 In Troxel
v. Granville, the Court took up a challenge to Washington
State’s grandparent-visitation statute. 16 There, a mother
sought to limit the time her children spent with their paternal
grandparents following the death of her husband. 17 The grandparents commenced an action under the state statute, which
provided that “[a]ny person may petition the court for visitation
rights at any time including, but not limited to, custody proceedings.” 18 The grandparents were successful at the state level, and the children’s mother appealed. 19 The Supreme Court
reversed, holding that the Washington statute infringed on the
Fourteenth Amendment parental rights of the mother because
it was not narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest. 20 In its opinion, the Court explicitly avoided the question of
“whether the Due Process Clause requires all nonparental visitation statutes to include a showing of harm or potential harm
to the child as a condition precedent to granting visitation.”21
Nonetheless, the Court implied that perhaps states could, in
certain situations, award visitation to nonparents. Unfortunately, the Court offered no clues as to what sorts of situations
might qualify, merely noting that a court “must accord at least
some special weight” to the wishes of the child’s parent. 22
14. David D. Meyer, The Paradox of Family Privacy, 53 VAND. L. REV. 527,
529 (2000) (“In articulating the scope of its review, the Court has seemed
consciously to avoid the familiar language of strict scrutiny, opting instead to
muddy the waters with ambiguous hedge phrases and arguable synonyms.”).
15. See Emily Buss, Adrift in the Middle: Parental Rights After Troxel v.
Granville, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 279, 280 (2000) (“While Troxel itself is a narrow
ruling on a particularly problematic statute, it is the Supreme Court’s first word,
and perhaps only word, on a subject of considerable interest to courts and
legislatures throughout the country.”).
16. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 60 (2000).
17. Id. at 60–61.
18. Id. at 61 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3) (2018)).
19. Id.
20. Id. at 72–73.
21. Id. at 73 (“We do not, and need not, define today the precise scope of the
parental due process right in the visitation context.”).
22. Id. at 70.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3217698

7. HIGDON_ (DO NOT DELETE)

946

UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO LAW REVIEW

6/4/2019 4:35 PM

[Vol. 90

In the years immediately following the Supreme Court’s
decision, state courts 23 and scholars 24 alike attempted to discern exactly how to handle quasi-parent claims brought by
third parties. Today, because of the lack of any meaningful direction by the Court, state courts have developed a variety of
standards. Accordingly, where a person happens to live will determine whether they qualify as a quasi-parent and, if so, to
what rights they are entitled. As one commentator, writing
shortly after Troxel was decided, noted: “[T]he standard for
governmental interference with parental rights remains extremely vague. The plurality did not make clear what factors
are important to consider when determining whether a visitation statute adequately protects parents’ rights, and it did not
examine the important constitutional issues implicated in the
case.” 25
In all fairness to the Supreme Court and the states, quasiparenthood presents an extremely complicated issue. 26 To develop a workable rule, states must first answer a number of difficult questions. First, whether a person has spent sufficient
time in the life of a child to transition from mere caregiver to
quasi-parent. Second, whether the quasi-parent’s claim should
prevail against the right of the legal parent to decide who has

23. See infra Part III.
24. See, e.g., Christina M. Alderfer, Troxel v. Granville: A Missed Opportunity
to Elucidate Children’s Rights, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 963 (2001); Buss, supra note
15, at 280; Solangel Maldonado, When Father (or Mother) Doesn’t Know Best:
Quasi-Parents and Parental Deference After Troxel v. Granville, 88 IOWA L. REV.
865 (2003); Ellen Marrus, Over the Hills and Through the Woods to Grandparents’
House We Go: Or Do We, Post-Troxel?, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 751, 755–56 (2001); David
D. Meyer, Lochner Redeemed: Family Privacy After Troxel and Carhart, 48 UCLA
L. REV. 1125, 1129–30 (2001); Cynthia Starnes, Swords in the Hands of Babes:
Rethinking Custody Interviews After Troxel, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 115, 118 (2003);
Alessia Bell, Note, Public and Private Child: Troxel v. Granville and the
Constitutional Rights of Family Members, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 225 (2001).
25. Alderfer, supra note 24, at 1005.
26. See In re Marriage of Lewis & Goetz, 250 Cal. Rptr. 30, 33 (Ct. App. 1988)
(“Given the complex practical, social and constitutional ramifications of the
‘equitable parent’ doctrine, we believe that the Legislature is better equipped to
consider expansion of current California law should it choose to do so.”); In re
Scarlett Z.-D., 28 N.E.3d 776, 790 (Ill. 2015) (“[S]tanding to petition for custody or
visitation is a complex issue that demands a comprehensive legislative solution.”);
Titchenal v. Dexter, 693 A.2d 682, 689 (Vt. 1997) (“Given the complex social and
practical ramifications of expanding the classes of persons entitled to assert
parental rights by seeking custody or visitation, the Legislature is better equipped
to deal with the problem.”).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3217698

7. HIGDON_ (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

6/4/2019 4:35 PM

THE QUASI-PARENT CONUNDRUM

947

access to the child. 27 Third, whether the child has an independent right to maintain contact with a quasi-parent and how to
balance that right with the decision-making authority of the legal parent. Finally, states must consider particularly thorny
questions like how to handle quasi-parenthood claims by those,
like foster parents, 28 who are legally sanctioned to act as temporary parents and what to do when quasi-parent claims would
subject the child to multiple adults with parental rights. 29
Since Troxel was decided, these questions have required
state courts to consider parental rights in a whole new light.
But as Troxel approaches its twentieth anniversary, the time
has come to reexamine the Court’s decision. The need to revisit
the issue of quasi-parenthood comes from the “seismic shift”
that is taking place within the American family. 30 In the twenty years post-Troxel, legal claims based on quasi-parenthood
are increasingly common because of increased patterns of “divorce, cohabitation, and remarriage.” 31 Douglas NeJaime has
described this evolution of the nuclear family as follows: “With
27. See Troxel, 530 U.S. at 70 (“In an ideal world, parents might always seek
to cultivate the bonds between grandparents and their grandchildren. Needless to
say, however, our world is far from perfect, and in it the decision whether such an
intergenerational relationship would be beneficial in any specific case is for the
parent to make in the first instance.”); see also Lulay v. Lulay, 739 N.E.2d 521,
531 (Ill. 2000) (“Encompassed within the well-established fundamental right of
parents to raise their children is the right to determine with whom their children
should associate.”); Eaton v. Paradis, 91 A.3d 590, 593 (Me. 2014) (“Parents have
a fundamental right to direct the upbringing of their children, including the right
to determine who may associate with their children.”); Hoff v. Berg, 595 N.W.2d
285, 291 (N.D. 1999) (“Deciding when, under what conditions, and with whom
their children may associate is among the most important rights and responsibilities of parents.”).
28. See Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. and Reform, 431 U.S. 816,
844–45 (1977) (holding that “we cannot dismiss the foster family as a mere
collection of unrelated individuals” and thus suggesting that there may exist some
liberty interest in the relationship between foster parents and their children).
29. As one scholar aptly points out, “[t]he best interests of the child are not
served by granting rights to more and more parental claimants.” JEFFREY
SHULMAN, THE CONSTITUTIONAL PARENT: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THE
ENFRANCHISEMENT OF THE CHILD 205 (2014).
30. Clare Huntington, Postmarital Family Law: A Legal Structure for
Nonmarital Families, 67 STAN. L. REV. 167, 184 (2015).
31. Linda C. McClain, A Diversity Approach to Parenthood in Family Life and
Family Law, in WHAT IS PARENTHOOD: CONTEMPORARY DEBATES ABOUT THE
FAMILY 41, 55 (Linda C. McClain & Daniel Cere eds., 2013); see also
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF GENDER AND SOCIETY 271 (Jodi O’Brien ed., 2012) (“The
marriage rate has declined in recent decades, especially among the poor, and the
remarriage rate has dropped. The increase in cohabitation largely accounts for
these decreases.”).
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more divorces came more second marriages. As divorced parents formed blended families—and other unmarried women
with children married—stepparents assumed parental roles.”32
An increasing number of children are being raised in households headed by adults who are neither their biological nor
adoptive parents, resulting in a society where “[m]ultiple parents . . . are a social reality, but not a legal category.” 33
The legalization of same-sex marriage has likewise pressed
the issue of quasi-parentage. In Obergefell v. Hodges, the Court
recognized that “hundreds of thousands of children” are currently being raised by same-sex couples. 34 However, because
same-sex couples cannot—at least at present 35—conceive using
only their genetic material, any child being raised by a samesex couple will have a biological connection with at most only
one adult member of the family. 36 The question then becomes
what is the legal status of the adult who does not have a biological connection to the child? Must that person adopt his or
her spouse’s child in order to have parental rights? And if not,
does that person nonetheless have some rights vis-á-vis the
child?
Indeed, the confluence of these various social changes has
helped give rise to a number of novel questions relating to parenthood—questions that have increasingly forced courts to decide whether someone who is neither the child’s biological nor
adoptive parent can nonetheless gain rights to the child simply
by virtue of having functioned as a parent. 37
At the same time, issues of quasi-parenthood arise not only
from the changing nuclear family but also as a result of the
continued presence of the extended family model within the
United States. By and large, the law has ignored this model of
family, which is particularly prevalent among ethnic and racial
32. Douglas NeJaime, Marriage Equality and the New Parenthood, 129 HARV.
L. REV. 1185, 1196 (2016).
33. Nancy E. Dowd, Multiple Parents/Multiple Fathers, 9 J.L. & FAM. STUD.
231, 231 (2007).
34. 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015).
35. As advances in assisted reproduction continue, even this may change. See
Michael Boucai, Is Assisted Procreation an LGBT Right?, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 1065,
1093 (2016) (discussing how in vitro gameteogenesis (IVG) might allow for sperm
cells to be converted to egg cells and vice versa, thereby permitting same-sex
couples to reproduce).
36. John A. Robertson, Gay and Lesbian Access to Assisted Reproductive
Technology, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 323, 324–25 (2004).
37. See infra Section I.A.2.
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minorities. 38 In her Troxel plurality, Justice O’Connor
explicitly referenced the extended family, noting that “in these
single-parent households, persons outside the nuclear family
are called upon with increasing frequency to assist in the
everyday tasks of child rearing.” 39 However, in the almost
twenty years that have elapsed since Troxel, the states have
lost sight of the extended family, adopting tests relating to
quasi-parenthood that are premised on a nuclear family
model. 40 Justice Kennedy, who dissented in Troxel, warned
against just such an approach, stating that his “principal
concern” was that the plurality opinion “seems to proceed from
the assumption that the parent or parents who resist visitation
have always been the child’s primary caregivers, . . . [which] in
turn, appears influenced by the concept that the conventional
nuclear family ought to establish the visitation standard for
every domestic relations case.” 41
Thus, while acknowledging the complex questions associated with quasi-parenthood, the focus of this Article concerns a
more foundational issue. As courts continue to struggle with
the appropriate test for quasi-parenthood, this Article takes the
position that the law has lost sight of one very important consideration—the complexity of the contemporary American family. Indeed, whereas American familial structures are more
heterogeneous than ever before, courts increasingly cling to the
“traditional” nuclear family model to develop standards for
quasi-parenthood rights. 42 As a result, despite the states’ increased willingness to protect a child’s relationship with a
quasi-parent, only children whose quasi-parents fit into the
traditional nuclear family model are benefiting from those
protections. The children from nontraditional families, which
disproportionately include ethnic and racial minorities, are
particularly at risk of the harms associated with having a
quasi-parent ripped from their life. 43
The goal of this Article is to correct that misunderstanding
of the American family structure and offer guidance on specific

38. See infra Section I.B.
39. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 64 (2000).
40. See infra Part III.
41. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 98.
42. See infra Part III.
43. See infra notes 391–393 and accompanying text (discussing the harms
that befall children in general when removed from the care of a quasi-parent).
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ways to make the law of quasi-parenthood more reflective of
the contemporary family and less discriminatory toward family
structures that stray from the traditional nuclear family model—a model that scholars have described as “vanishing” 44 and
“increasingly rare in modern society.” 45
With that goal in mind, Part I begins with an exploration
of how quasi-parenthood issues arise in contemporary family
settings. Given the multiplicity of family structures within the
United States, Part I first explores the changing composition of
the nuclear family, where immediate family units more often
contain individuals—including stepparents and same-sex partners—who have no biological or legal connection to the children
in their families. Part I also offers a detailed look at the extended family model—a model that has been largely ignored by
American law. Specifically, Part I explores the extended family
model and the related concept of informal adoption as it exists
in both the African American and Hispanic communities,
where childcare is much more communal and parentage more
fluid. Part II looks at the constitutional rights of parents as
those rights have developed over time, culminating in a discussion of Troxel—the one and only time the Court has provided
any guidance on the rights of parents vis-á-vis third parties.
Part III examines the case law that has emerged post-Troxel,
focusing on three discrete areas—standing to bring a quasiparent claim, the role parental fitness plays in adjudicating
such claims, and the extent to which a court should consider
the harm to the child if the quasi-parent’s claim is denied—in
which state courts have adopted standards that although seemingly consistent with the outer boundaries of Troxel, nonetheless discriminate against a number of modern American
families. Those standards pose great harms to a wide array of

44. Marie A. Failinger, A Peace Proposal for the Same-Sex Marriage Wars:
Restoring the Household to Its Proper Place, 10 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 195,
203 (2004) (“[S]o-called ‘traditional’ nuclear families consisting of a married
couple and their children have indeed recently shrunk as a proportion of the
American population.”).
45. Katherine H. Dampf, Happily Ever After: Eliminating the 890 Usufruct to
Protect the Blended Family, 74 LA. L. REV. 899, 902 (2014); see also Marjorie E.
Kornhauser, Love, Money, and the IRS: Family, Income-Sharing, and the Joint
Income Tax Return, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 63, 66 (1993) (“The major demographic
changes of the past thirty years—declining fertility, rising divorce rates,
increasing rates of out-of-wedlock births, aging population—have caused the
decline of the traditional nuclear family.”).
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children. Part III concludes with concrete suggestions for how,
in those three areas, state courts can craft standards that not
only comply with the constitutional rights of parents but are
also more inclusive of children being reared in the contemporary American family.
I.

THE EMERGENCE OF QUASI-PARENTHOOD

To best understand where quasi-parenthood fits in the law
of domestic relations, it is necessary to understand how the
phenomenon of quasi-parenthood arises. There are, no doubt,
instances of adults who informally adopt children who were
complete strangers; 46 however, adults who act as quasi-parents
are generally individuals who have a preexisting familial relationship with the child. 47 This Part focuses on who quasi-parents with preexisting familial relationships tend to be and how
they typically transition from mere acquaintances to quasiparents. In doing so, this Part looks at the two most common
family models: the nuclear family and the extended family. Because quasi-parenthood arises somewhat differently in each,
they are discussed separately. The nuclear family model, despite the fact that it is “less prevalent,” 48 is discussed first because it has historically been the “most widely valued model of
family” 49 by American courts.

46. Consider, for instance, the character of Heathcliff from Emily Brontë’s
Wuthering Heights who, after being discovered on the streets of Liverpool, was
brought to Yorkshire and raised (but seemingly not adopted) by the Earnshaw
family. EMILY BRONTË, WUTHERING HEIGHTS (Barnes & Noble Classics, 2005).
47. See, e.g., Cynthia R. Mabry, African Americans “Are Not Carbon Copies” of
White Americans—The Role of African American Culture in Mediation of Family
Disputes, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 405, 436 (1998) (“Informal adoptions
take place when relatives or family friends assume the responsibility of caring for
a child for an indefinite period.”).
48. Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, From Contract to Status:
Collaboration and the Evolution of Novel Family Relationships, 115 COLUM. L.
REV. 293, 302 (2015); see also sources cited supra note 45 and accompanying text.
49. Janet L. Dolgin, The Constitution as Family Arbiter: A Moral in the Mess?,
102 COLUM. L. REV. 337, 383 (2002).
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A. Quasi-Parenthood in the Nuclear Family Model
Although regarded as “the archetype in American law and
politics,” 50 the nuclear family model is very much on the decline—a decline that is most pronounced when it comes to the
traditional nuclear family, typically defined as “heterosexual
married couples living with their own children.” 51 After all,
marriages are no longer exclusively heterosexual, and cohabitating couples are less likely than ever before to be legally married. 52 Both of these changes to the traditional nuclear family
have fostered situations in which quasi-parenthood is much
more common. 53 Accordingly, unlike the relatively invisibile
role that the extended family has played in American law, 54
one can find a number of judicial opinions that wrestle with the
rights of quasi-parents in nuclear families made up of stepparents, cohabiting partners, and/or same-sex spouses.
A brief look at some representative cases is instructive in
order to better understand how claims by quasi-parents typically arise and how the courts deal with them. Notwithstanding Professor David Meyer’s observation that “[a] growing
number of courts and legislatures now permit adults who assumed the functional role of parent to preserve their relation-

50. Developments in the Law—The Law of Marriage and Family,
Introduction: Nuclear Nonproliferation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1999, 2001 (2003); see
also Andrew Koppelman, Judging the Case Against Same-Sex Marriage, 2014 U.
ILL. L. REV. 431, 437 (2014) (critiquing Amy Wax’s conclusion that the heterosexual nuclear family model is the “gold standard”).
51. June Carbone, Out of the Channel and into the Swamp: How Family Law
Fails in A New Era of Class Division, 39 HOFSTRA L. REV. 859, 880 (2011); see also
Amy L. Wax, The Discriminating Mind: Define It, Prove It, 40 CONN. L. REV. 979,
1000 n.48 (2008) (describing the traditional nuclear family model as “two married
parents living with their shared biological children”).
52. See, e.g., Steven K. Berenson, Should Cohabitation Matter in Family
Law?, 13 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 289, 315 (2011) (noting that “most cohabitating
couples do so consciously as an alternative to marriage”); Twila L. Perry,
Dissolution Planning in Family Law: A Critique of Current Analyses and a Look
Toward the Future, 24 FAM. L.Q. 77, 78 (1990) (“As an alternative to marriage,
more couples are choosing to cohabit.”).
53. See, e.g., Wendy D. Manning et al., Cohabitation and Parenthood: Lessons
from Focus Groups and In-Depth Interviews, in MARRIAGE AND FAMILY:
PERSPECTIVES AND COMPLEXITIES 115, 117 (H. Elizabeth Peters & Claire Kamp
Dush eds., 2009) (“Approximately half of children living with cohabitating parents
are living with one biological parent and his or her cohabiting partner.”).
54. See infra Section III.A.
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ship with a child,” 55 historically, as illustrated below, courts
have been resistant to recognizing such relationships. 56
1. Stepparents and Cohabitating Partners
A group of researchers recently noted that “[o]ne of the
most important changes in family life over the past 50 years
has been the increase in family complexity, arising from higher
rates of divorce, nonmarital childbearing, cohabitation, and remarriage.” 57 Specifically:
In 2009, only 69 percent of children lived with two parents,
down from 85 percent in 1960. More specifically, 59 percent
of children lived with two biological married parents, 3 percent lived with two biological cohabiting parents, and 7 percent lived with a biological parent who was married to a
stepparent. . . . Close to 3 percent lived with a single mother
and her cohabiting partner. Overall, it is far less common
for children to live with two married biological parents today than it was 50 years ago and far more common to live
with a single mother, with stepparents, or in a multigenerational household. 58

As adult relationships become less formal and less enduring, children are more likely to have “legal strangers” 59 come
into their lives and occupy a parental role—one that produces
55. David D. Meyer, Partners, Care Givers, and the Constitutional Substance
of Parenthood, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY: CRITIQUE ON THE AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE’S PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION 47, 50 (Robin
Fretwell Wilson ed., 2006).
56. See, e.g., Julia Frost Davies, Two Moms and a Baby: Protecting the
Nontraditional Family Through Second Parent Adoptions, 29 NEW ENG. L. REV.
1055, 1066 (1995) (“Courts, however, have been reluctant to recognize more than
one mother and one father per child.”).
57. Ariel Kalil et. al., Time Investments in Children Across Family Structures,
654 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 150, 150 (2014).
58. Id. at 151.
59. The term “legal stranger” is often used as a synonym for “nonparent.” See,
e.g., John DeWitt Gregory, Blood Ties: A Rationale for Child Visitation by Legal
Strangers, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 351 (1998) (using “nonparent” and “legal
stranger” interchangeably); David D. Meyer, What Constitutional Law Can Learn
from the ALI Principles of Family Dissolution, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1075, 1087
(2001) (“Lacking traditional recognition as parents, long-time caregivers lacking
biological or adoptive ties are classified as nonparents, or legal ‘strangers,’ for
constitutional purposes.”).
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strong emotional ties with the child. 60 Given the lack of a
biological or legal connection to the child, the question arises as
to whether such an individual could ever become a “parent.”
Further, how would such recognition impact the parental
rights of the child’s biological parents?
When it comes to cohabiting partners, many courts have
refused claims for parental rights brought by the nonlegal parent. Consider, for instance, the case of Donald, who lived with
his girlfriend, Tamera, and her son for seven years. 61 Donald,
despite being neither the child’s legal nor biological father, had
nonetheless assumed responsibility for helping raise the boy.62
When the relationship between Donald and Tamera ended,
Donald filed for visitation, claiming that he was a de facto parent. 63 The lower court dismissed his petition on the basis that
“at common law a nonparent had no right to visitation with a
minor child,” 64 and the Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed. 65 In its ruling, the court stated that “[b]efore a parent’s
right to custody over his or her own children will be disturbed
in favor of a nonparent[,] a clear showing against the parent of
‘gross misconduct or unfitness, or of other extraordinary circumstances affecting the welfare of the child’ is required.” 66 According to the court, Donald failed to make any such showing.67
In holding as it did, the court made clear that “an award cannot be made to [quasi-parents] simply because they may be bet-

60. See Mabry, supra note 47, at 443 (“The psychological parent theory stands
for the proposition that people who are not necessarily biological parents may
form strong emotional bonds with children.”); Maldonado, supra note 24, at 910–
11 (“[C]hildren develop significant emotional bonds with third parties who
function as parents.”).
61. Cooper v. Merkel, 470 N.W.2d 253, 254 (S.D. 1991).
62. Id. at 254.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 256.
66. Id. at 255 (quoting Langerman v. Langerman, 336 N.W.2d 669, 670 (S.D.
1983)).
67. Id. at 256 (“Donald’s motion for visitation contained no charge that
Tamera was unfit or guilty of misconduct nor was there any allegation of unusual
circumstances. The motion merely alleged that Donald helped raise Tamera’s son
and that having assumed part of that responsibility he should be granted the
opportunity to visit the boy.”).
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ter custodians.” 68 South Dakota is not alone when it comes to
following such a rigid approach. 69
Even in cases involving married couples, stepparents have
met resistance when trying to gain parental rights over the
children they helped raise. For example, in a 2014 case out of
Illinois, Miki finalized the adoption of her son William three
months prior to her marriage to Nicholas. 70 William was not
quite one year old, and Miki had adopted him as a single parent. 71 Nicholas had also intended to adopt William but never
completed the process. 72 Nicholas did, however, hold himself
out as William’s father and maintained that he served as the
child’s primary caregiver. 73 When Miki filed for divorce, Nicholas petitioned for sole custody of William. 74 In response, Miki
successfully moved to dismiss his petition on the basis that
Nicholas was not the child’s legal parent. 75 Nicholas appealed,
claiming that “he acted as William’s father in every way and
has developed a bond with William such that he should be recognized as William’s ‘equitable parent.’” 76 The court rejected
his argument, noting that the state had not recognized equitable parentage and that Nicholas, despite knowing “at all times
that he would have to formally adopt William in order to be his
legal parent,” failed to do so. 77 In ruling as it did, the court
seemed to suggest that Nicholas could have protected his right
but chose not to. Entirely missing from the court’s analysis is
(1) the fact that William had no ability to compel the adoption

68. Id. at 255 (quoting Langerman, 336 N.W.2d at 670).
69. See, e.g., Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 582 (Tenn. 1993) (declaring
unconstitutional under the state constitution a statute that permitted grandparent visitation on the basis that it infringed the parents’ right to make “childrearing decisions” where there was no evidence of harm to a child); see also Robin
Fretwell Wilson, Undeserved Trust: Reflections on the ALI’s Treatment of de Facto
Parents, in RECONCEIVING THE FAMILY, supra note 55, at 98 (“Very few [jurisdictions] permit unmarried cohabitants to initiate action for custody or visitation.”).
70. In re Marriage of Mancine and Gansner, 9 N.E.3d 550, 555 (Ill. App. Ct.
2014).
71. Id. (“Because Miki had already started the adoption process of William as
a single parent before she met Nicholas, Miki and Nicholas were advised by the
adoption agent to finish the process of Miki’s adoption of William, and then for
Nicholas to adopt William as a stepparent after the parties’ marriage.”).
72. Id. at 555–56.
73. Id. at 556.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 565.
77. Id. at 568.
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and (2) any consideration of the harm likely to befall William in
losing the quasi-parent who was his primary caregiver. 78
Some courts have been more sympathetic to the claims of
stepparents. For instance, in a pre-Troxel opinion from 1992,
the Minnesota Court of Appeals granted visitation to a stepfather, David, over the objections of the child’s mother, JoEllen. 79
The couple had married in 1989. 80 At the time, JoEllen had a
five-year-old son from a previous relationship. 81 When the couple separated twenty months later, David petitioned the court
for visitation. 82 While acknowledging that “the question of
whether a former stepparent may assert a common-law right
to visitation is one of first impression,” the court ruled in David’s favor. 83 The court held that “a former stepparent who was
in loco parentis with the former stepchild may be entitled
to visitation under the common law.” 84 Finding nothing in the
record to contradict the trial court’s determination that visitation with David would be in the child’s best interest, the court
affirmed. 85
Thus, despite the fact that more and more children are
being reared (sometimes exclusively) by stepparents, the protections afforded stepparents and cohabiting partners vary by
state. Although state variation is not an inherently bad thing,
discrimination on the basis of family structure and the harm
such discrimination plays in the lives of children is something
the law should not tolerate. In that regard, Justice Kennedy’s
opinion in Obergefell is instructive. There, he spoke of the impact that familial equality has on children, noting that discrimination in the context of marriage forces “children [to] suffer the stigma of knowing their families are somehow lesser.” 86
78. See infra Section III.C (outlining the harms that can befall children who
are removed from the care of a quasi-parent).
79. Simmons v. Simmons, 486 N.W.2d 788, 789 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992).
80. Id. at 789.
81. Id. (“[The] biological father has had no contact with him and has
surrendered his parental rights.”).
82. Id. at 789–90.
83. Id. at 790–91.
84. Id. According to the court, “[b]ecause section 257.022 does not contain any
clause specifically repealing, restricting, or abridging a non-parent’s common-law
visitation rights, we construe the statute to extend and supplement the commonlaw rule.”
85. Id. at 792 (noting that “[t]he trial court has broad discretion to determine
the child’s best interests in the area of visitation”).
86. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600 (2015).
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2. Same-Sex Couples
As Justice Kennedy noted in his majority opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges, “hundreds of thousands of children are presently being raised” by same-sex couples—couples who “provide
loving and nurturing homes to their children, whether biological or adopted.” 87 For same-sex couples who jointly adopt, parenthood determinations present little difficulty. However, for
biological children being raised in same-sex households, the
questions become more difficult. After all, two people of the
same sex cannot currently conceive a child using only their genetic material. 88 Thus, any child whose biological parent is in a
same-sex relationship will, at most, be the biological child of
only one of the adults in that family. For that person’s spouse
or partner—that is, the person who lacks a biological relationship with the child—states have had to grapple with the question of that individual’s parental rights. As a result, a number
of state cases have emerged that show how courts have dealt
with claims by adults in same-sex households who lack biological connections with their children. 89
One option has been to apply the marital presumption, the
name given to the “common-law rule that a child born to a
married woman, assuming her husband was neither impotent
nor out of the country at the time of conception, is conclusively . . . presumed to be” the husband’s child. 90 Although the

87. Id.
88. See Boucai, supra note 35, at 1093; Robertson, supra note 36, at 324–25.
89. Currently, the available cases on this subject concern lesbian couples.
That is likely attributable to the fact that, given the different roles men and
women play in the reproduction cycle, it is much easier for a lesbian couple to
have children using assisted reproduction technologies than for a same-sex male
couple. See NeJaime, supra note 32, at 1200 (“With the rise of alternative
insemination in the late 1970s and 1980s, the number of lesbian couples starting
families skyrocketed.”). Same-sex male couples, on the other hand, who desire
children with a biological connection to one of the fathers would have to use some
version of surrogacy, which is exponentially more expensive, more complicated,
and thus more unusual. See Robertson, supra note 36, at 350 (“[A] surrogate
mother is essential for gay male reproduction to occur.”); see also RICHARD A.
POSNER, SEX AND REASON 306 (1992) (“The overall picture is definitely brighter
for lesbians, for in addition to the factors already mentioned, it is simple for a
lesbian to become pregnant through artificial insemination, an option not open to
the male homosexual.”).
90. David M. Wagner, Balancing “Parents Are” and “Parents Do” in the
Supreme Court’s Constitutionalized Family Law: Some Implications for the ALI
Proposals on De Facto Parenthood, 2001 BYU L. REV. 1175, 1181 n.32.
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rule was historically cast in terms of “husband” and “wife,” at
least one court has adapted the marital presumption to samesex couples by using the term “spouse.” In 2013, in the case of
Gartner v. Iowa Dept. of Public Health, the Iowa Supreme
Court did just that. 91 Melissa and Heather Gartner married in
June 2009, just a few months after Iowa legalized same-sex
marriage. 92 After Heather became pregnant using artificial insemination, the state Department of Health refused to list
Melissa’s name on the birth certificate. 93
Iowa’s marital presumption provides that “[i]f the mother
was married at the time of conception, birth, or at any time
during the period between conception and birth, the name of
the husband shall be entered on the certificate.” 94 The Department believed this statute to be inapplicable to same-sex couples: “The system for registration of births in Iowa currently
recognizes the biological and ‘gendered’ roles of ‘mother’ and
‘father,’ grounded in the biological fact that a child has one biological mother and one biological father.” 95
The Supreme Court of Iowa disagreed with the Department of Health and held that interpreting the marital presumption to apply to opposite-sex but not same-sex couples
would violate the equal protection guarantee of the Iowa Constitution. 96 Specifically, the court held that treating same-sex
couples differently would amount to discrimination on the basis
of either sex or sexual orientation, either of which under the
Iowa Constitution would trigger intermediate scrutiny. 97 Accordingly, the court directed the Department of Health to issue
a corrected birth certificate that listed both mothers’ names. 98
91. 830 N.W.2d 335, 341 (Iowa 2013).
92. Id. at 341.
93. Id. at 341–42 (“The certificate only listed Heather as Mackenzie’s parent.
The space for the second parent’s name was blank.”).94.Id. at 344 (quoting IOWA
CODE § 144.13(2)).
94. Id. at 344 (quoting IOWA CODE § 144.13(2)).
95. Id. at 342.
96. Id. at 354. The court noted that, under the Iowa Constitution, “the equal
protection guarantee requires that laws treat all those who are similarly situated
with respect to the purposes of the law alike.” Id. at 351 (quoting Varnum v. Brien,
763 N.W.2d 862, 883 (Iowa 2009)).
97. Id. at 351–52. Per the court, both same-sex and opposite-sex couples were
similarly situated in this regard: “The Gartners are in a legally recognized marriage, just like opposite-sex couples. The official recognition of their child as part
of their family provides a basis for identifying and verifying the birth of their
child, just as it does for opposite-sex couples.” Id. at 351.
98. Id. at 354.
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In so ruling, the court held that the state failed to prove that
its interpretation of the marital presumption was substantially
related to any important governmental objective: “It is important for our laws to recognize that married lesbian couples who
have children enjoy the same benefits and burdens as married
opposite-sex couples who have children.” 99 The court went so
far as to suggest that “the only explanation for not listing the
nonbirthing lesbian spouse on the birth certificate is stereotype
or prejudice.” 100
However, on the same issue, the Supreme Court of Arkansas reached the opposite conclusion, upholding the Arkansas
Department of Health’s refusal “to issue birth certificates for
minor children of married female couples showing the name of
the spouse of the mother.” 101 The Arkansas statute in question
provided as follows: “[I]f the mother was married at the time of
either conception or birth or between conception and birth the
name of the husband shall be entered on the certificate as the
father of the child.” 102 In interpreting the statute, the court
first found that its purpose was “to truthfully record the nexus
of the biological mother and the biological father to the
child.” 103 Accordingly, the court ruled that the statute must be
strictly construed using the “ordinary and usually accepted
meaning” of the statutory terms. 104 Turning to the word “husband,” the court noted that Webster’s dictionary defines the
term as “a married man.” 105 In contrast to the Supreme Court
of Iowa, the Arkansas court did not see any equal protection violation in this gendered reading of the statute. Indeed, the
court rejected the very suggestion, stating that same-sex
spouses were not similarly situated to those of the opposite sex:
“[T]he female spouse of a biological mother . . . does not have
the same biological nexus to the child that the biological moth-

99. Id. at 353. Specifically, in terms of birth certificates, “married lesbian
couples require accurate records of their child’s birth, as do their opposite-sex
counterparts. The distinction for this purpose between married opposite-sex
couples and married lesbian couples does not exist and cannot defeat an equal
protection analysis.” Id. at 351.
100. Id. at 353.
101. Smith v. Pavan, 505 S.W.3d 169, 172 (2016) (emphasis added).
102. Id. at 175 (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-18-401(f)(1)).
103. Id. at 180.
104. Id. at 177.
105. Id. at 177–78 (quoting WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1104 (2002)).
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er or the biological father has.” 106 Although the U.S. Supreme
Court subsequently issued a summary reversal, it did so without even mentioning the constitutional rights of parents or
those who have functioned as parents. 107 Instead, the Court
seemed to rely on an equal protection argument, limiting its
holding to the narrow ground that by making the marital presumption available to married opposite-sex couples, Arkansas
could not withhold that same benefit from married same-sex
couples. 108
For same-sex couples who are unmarried, states have
likewise reached divergent opinions regarding the parental status of nonmarried individuals vis-à-vis the biological children
of their same-sex partners. In Elisa B. v. Superior Court, for
instance, the Supreme Court of California extended parental
obligations to Elisa, the former partner of a woman who had
conceived twins via artificial insemination. 109 Although Elisa
had no biological relationship to the children and the two women were never married, the court nonetheless ruled that she
was a legal parent under the terms of the state’s paternity statute. 110 Specifically, California law provided that “a man is presumed to be the natural father of a child,” if “[h]e receives the
child into his home and openly holds out the child as his natural child.” 111 Despite the fact that the statute was phrased in
terms of fathers, another statute provided that, when attempting to establish a mother-child relationship, “the provisions of
this part applicable to the father and child relationship apply.” 112 In light of that statutory directive, and given the active

106. Id. at 181. In support, the court quoted from the Supreme Court’s decision
in Tuan Anh Nguyen v. I.N.S., 533 U.S. 53, 73 (2001): “To fail to acknowledge
even our most basic biological differences . . . risks making the guarantee of equal
protection superficial, and so disserving it.” Pavan, 505 S.W.3d at 181. Thus, the
Pavan court concluded that “[i]t does not violate equal protection to acknowledge
basic biological truths.” Id.
107. Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017).
108. Id. at 2078–79 (“The State uses [the marital presumption] to give married
parents a form of legal recognition that is not available to unmarried parents.
Having made that choice, Arkansas may not, consistent with Obergefell, deny
married same-sex couples that recognition.”).
109. 117 P.3d 660 (Cal. 2005).
110. Id. at 662.
111. Id. at 667 (quoting CAL. FAM. CODE § 7611(d) (2005)). California
subsequently amended the statute to make it gender neutral. See 2013 Cal. Legis.
Serv. ch. 510 (A.B. 1403) (West).
112. Id. at 665 (quoting CAL. FAM. CODE § 7650 (2005)).
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role Elisa had played in the twins’ early life, the court held that
Elisa was a legal parent. 113
In other states, courts have refused to afford same-sex
partners such recognition even when it was the intent of all involved that the individual would serve as the child’s parent and
even when the person affirmatively performed that role. For
instance, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin remanded a case
with facts similar to that of Elisa B., noting that for a same-sex
partner of a biological parent to receive any parental rights
whatsoever, she would have to prove that “she has a parent-like
relationship with the child and that a significant triggering
event justifies state intervention in the child’s relationship
with a biological or adoptive parent.” 114 In other words, the
court seemed to assume that a same-sex partner in that position had no claim to legal parenthood but perhaps could qualify
as a quasi-parent.
But therein lies the rub. If quasi-parenthood is premised
on an outdated model of family that effectively excludes samesex partners, there is no recourse for those individuals to protect their relationships with the children they helped parent.
This is no small problem. After all, with the Court’s ruling in
Obergefell, more and more children are being raised by married
couples who also happen to be of the same gender. However,
when it comes to determining the parental rights of the biological parent’s same-sex spouse, the states are in such conflict
that many children being raised by same-sex married couples
will lack the safeguards typically enjoyed by the children of opposite-sex marriages—a result that goes directly against one of
the Court’s rationales for its decision in Obergefell. 115 The best
113. According to the court:
Elisa is a presumed mother of the twins . . . because she received the
children into her home and openly held them out as her natural children,
and that this is not an appropriate action in which to rebut the
presumption that Elisa is the twins’ parent with proof that she is not the
children’s biological mother because she actively participated in causing
the children to be conceived with the understanding that she would raise
the children as her own together with the birth mother, she voluntarily
accepted the rights and obligations of parenthood after the children were
born, and there are no competing claims to her being the children’s
second parent.
Id. at 670.
114. See In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995).
115. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2590 (2015) (“Without the recognition, stability, and predictability marriage offers, their children suffer the stigma
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solution would be to recognize the two married adults—whatever their sex—as the legal parents of the child. If, however,
the states are unwilling to provide statutory recognition or if a
couple is unmarried, there needs to be some meaningful protection—beyond “the time-consuming, costly, and invasive process
of adopt[ion]” 116—for the adult who plays the role of quasi-parent.
B. Quasi-Parenthood in the Extended Family Model
In Moore v. City of East Cleveland, Justice Brennan recognized that the extended family “provided generations of early
Americans with social services and economic and emotional
support in times of hardship, and was the beachhead for successive waves of immigrants who populated our cities.” 117 Additionally, Justice Brennan noted that the extended family “remains not merely still a pervasive living pattern, but under the
goad of brutal economic necessity, a prominent pattern—virtually a means of survival—for large numbers of the poor and deprived minorities of our society.” 118 Justice Brennan’s observations, although written in 1977, remain true today.
Indeed, although most Americans tend to define family
using the nuclear family model, a large percentage of American
families do not conform to that standard. 119 Instead, under the

of knowing their families are somehow lesser.”); see also Douglas NeJaime, The
Nature of Parenthood, 126 YALE L.J. 2260 (2017) (“[A]s courts and legislatures
approach the parental claims of women and same-sex couples within existing
frameworks organized around marital and biological relationships, they reproduce
some of the very gender- and sexuality-based asymmetries embedded in those
frameworks.”).
116. NeJaime, supra note 115, at 2264. Not to mention the fact that requiring
adoption by same-sex spouses but not opposite-sex spouses is discriminatory and
likely constitutionally infirm. See Nancy D. Polikoff, A Mother Should Not Have to
Adopt Her Own Child: Parentage Laws for Children of Lesbian Couples in the
Twenty-First Century, 5 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 201, 267 (2009)
(“[R]ecognition of a child’s family should not depend upon the family’s access to
court proceedings that require a lawyer and take two precious and limited
commodities—time and money.”).
117. 431 U.S. 494, 508 (1977).
118. Id.
119. Jessica Feinberg, The Plus One Policy: An Autonomous Model of Family
Reunification, 11 NEV. L.J. 629, 640 (2011) (“[W]ith the decreasing prevalence of
the traditional nuclear family structure, extended family households have
experienced a recent resurgence in the United States.”); Jerry Simon Chasen &
Elizabeth F. Schwartz, Estate and Gift Tax Planning for Nontraditional Families,
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extended family model, “family” encompasses “kinships” that
include grandparents, aunts, uncles, cousins, and other relatives who, although related by blood or marriage, typically do
not reside in the home with the nuclear family. 120 Additionally,
the extended family model also includes “fictive kinships,” defined as “kinshiplike relationship[s] between persons not related by blood or marriage, who also have some reciprocal social or economic relationship.” 121 As one commentator points
out: “While many cultures place higher priority on genetically
based kinships in terms of members’ roles and obligations to
such kin groups, other cultures, especially in collectivistic societies, regard fictive kinships as equally important in the daily
lives of their members.” 122
Kinship relationships can be quite beneficial because they
“provide a structure of interconnectedness and obligation sufficiently powerful, resilient, and flexible to insure support and
shelter for all members of the community in times of need and
to serve as a buffer between individuals and the impersonal
state.” 123 One of the more specific benefits of the extended family model is the greater ability of family units to care for chilPROB. & PROP., Jan./Feb. 2001, at 6, 8 (“Extended families are the most prevalent
type of nontraditional household among midlife and older persons.”).
120. C. Quince Hopkins, The Supreme Court’s Family Law Doctrine Revisited:
Insights from Social Science on Family Structures and Kinship Change in the
United States, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 431, 433–34 (2004) (“Kinship is
defined as a system of rights and responsibilities between particular categories of
people, and refers not only to biological or legal connections between people but
also to particular positions in a network of relationships.” (internal quotes and
citations omitted)).
121. Signithia Fordham & John U. Ogbu, Black Students’ School Success:
Coping with the “Burden of ‘Acting White,’” in MINORITY STATUS, OPPOSITIONAL
CULTURE, & SCHOOL 593, 601 (John U. Ogbu ed., 2008); see also Barbara Bennett
Woodhouse, “It All Depends on What You Mean by Home”: Toward a
Communitarian Theory of the “Nontraditional” Family, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 569,
591–92 (“‘Fictive kinship’ is the term anthropologists use to describe a binding
relationship between individuals similar to that of close blood kin but not based
on birth, marriage, or descent.”).
122. Kwok Leung & Soon Ang, Culture, Organizations, and Institutions: An
Integrative Review, in CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF CULTURE, ORGANIZATIONS, AND
WORK 23, 32 (Rabi S. Bhagat & Richard M. Steers eds., 2011).
123. Woodhouse, supra note 121, at 594; see also Melba J.T. Vasquez, Troxel v.
Granville: Impact on Ethnic Minority Families, 41 FAM. CT. REV. 54, 56–57 (2003)
(“[T]he inclusiveness of the extended family network provides support in many
ways and on various levels, including child rearing, lending money in times of
need, and assistance in negotiating through the labyrinth of larger systems that
newly arrived family members will encounter, whether they are from another
state or another country.”).
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dren, often through the practice of informal adoption. 124 When
it comes to marginalized communities, where rates of poverty
are higher and education lower, the practice of informal adoption is quite common. 125 Thus, given the degree to which American society frequently marginalizes racial and ethnic minorities, it is not surprising to learn that many children in those
communities are being raised by adults who are not their legal
parents. The practice of “kinship care” in American society is
most pervasive within African American and Hispanic communities. 126 Thus, to better understand the prevalence of quasiparenthood within the United States as well as the societal
pressures underlying quasi-parenthood in the extended family
model, a brief discussion of informal adoption within both communities is warranted. 127
1. Extended Family in African American
Communities
Noted historian and professor Tera Hunter recently observed that “[w]hite families are judged as the standard
124. Susan L. Waysdorf, Families in the AIDS Crisis: Access, Equality,
Empowerment, and the Role of Kinship Caregivers, 3 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 145, 213
n.248 (1994) (quoting Authorization for Medical Consent for Children in the Care
of Adults Other than Parents, 1993: Hearings on Bill 10-15 Before the Comm. on
Human Servs. 2-4 (D.C. 1993) (statement of Annie J. Goodson, Exec. Assistant to
the Comm’r on Soc. Sers., Dep’t of Human Servs.)) (“From the earliest recorded
history, parents have relied on extended families to care for their children during
times of need or stress.”); see also infra notes 144–164, 196–212 and accompanying text.
125. Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage: A New Model
for State Policy, 70 CAL. L. REV. 204, 246 n.126 (1982) (“[E]xtended families of
varying types are more prevalent among racial or ethnic minority groups and
among the poor.”); Gary B. Melton, Children, Families, and the Courts in the
Twenty-First Century, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1993, 2023 (1993) (“[M]ost ethnic groups
place greater reliance on extended family.”); Issac J.K. Adams, Growing Pains:
The Scope of Substantive Due Process Rights of Parents of Adult Children, 57
VAND. L. REV. 1883, 1927 (2004) (noting “the prevalence of extended family households among racial and ethnic minorities”).
126. See, e.g., A. Mechele Dickerson, Race Matters in Bankruptcy, 61 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 1725, 1746 (2004) (“The rearing or informal adoption of children by
members of their extended family for both short and long periods of time is more
likely among blacks and Hispanics than among other racial groups.”).
127. Although significantly supplemented and updated, portions of the research compiled in the following two Sections first appeared in a much earlier
article of mine dealing with the subject of intestate succession. See Michael J.
Higdon, When Informal Adoption Meets Intestate Succession: The Cultural Myopia
of the Equitable Adoption Doctrine, 43 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 223, 230 (2008).
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against which black families are assessed as dysfunctional in
comparisons that refuse to account for the conditions that
white supremacy created and commanded in order to sustain
itself and prosper for centuries.” 128 Despite the negative stereotypes that exist, African American families are not at all dysfunctional but have instead been described as “healthy productive households” 129—they simply “do not conform to prevailing
notions of the nuclear family.” 130 As noted by Professor Shirley
A. Hill, “the social construction of the ideal family as a twoparent nuclear unit with a breadwinner father and a homemaker mother . . . was never a tradition among Black families.” 131 Instead, for the African American community, “family
and household are not the same thing,” 132 with “family” encompassing not only the members of a particular household but
also “patterns of sharing and exchange of favors across networks of siblings, aunts, uncles, and other family members.”133
Although statistics on this point are somewhat difficult to come
by, studies have shown that anywhere from 25 to 44 percent of
African Americans live in an extended family, 134 compared
with only 11 percent of white Americans who live in an extended family. 135
128. TERA W. HUNTER, BOUND IN WEDLOCK: SLAVE AND FREE BLACK
MARRIAGE IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 300 (2017).
129. Pamela J. Smith, Comment, All-Male Black Schools and the Equal
Protection Clause: A Step Forward Toward Education, 66 TUL. L. REV. 2003, 2055
(1992) (quoting BELL HOOKS, YEARNING: RACE, GENDER, AND CULTURAL POLITICS
77 (1990)).
130. Id.
131. Shirley A. Hill, Class, Race, and Gender Dimensions of Child Rearing in
African American Families, 31 J. BLACK STUD. 494, 495–96 (2001).
132. Niara Sudarkasa, African American Families and Family Values, in
BLACK FAMILIES 9, 20 (Harriette Pipes McAdoo ed., 3d ed. 1997).
133. FAYE Z. BELGRAVE, AFRICAN AMERICAN GIRLS: REFRAMING PERCEPTIONS
AND CHANGING EXPERIENCES 34 (2009) (“Extended family members may live
within or outside the home and include grandparents, cousins, aunts, and
uncles.”); Martha Minow, All in the Family & in All Families: Membership,
Loving, and Owing, 95 W. VA. L. REV. 275, 324 (1992–93).
134. See, e.g., Darlene B. Hannah, The Black Extended Family: An Appraisal of
its Past, Present, and Future Statuses, in THE BLACK FAMILY: PAST, PRESENT, AND
FUTURE 33, 35 (Lee N. June ed., 1991) (estimating “the percentage of Black
extended families” to be between 25 and 33 percent).
135. Cynthia G. Hawkins-León, The Indian Child Welfare Act and the African
American Tribe: Facing the Adoption Crisis, 36 BRANDEIS J. FAM. L. 201, 210–11
(1998) (“[F]orty-four percent of African Americans live in an extended family
situation, whereas only eleven percent of whites reflect a similar family structure.”). Not surprisingly, one finds similar familial structures in West Africa, the
location from which most enslaved Americans were taken. Sudarkasa, supra note
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Furthermore, “[b]lood ties have not held the preeminent
position in Black families that they have held in white families.” 136 African Americans are also less likely to see marriage
as the necessary step to family formation. One study found that
only 32 percent of blacks over the age of eighteen were married,
contrasted with 56 percent of whites. 137 Thus, within the African American community, the concept of family frequently
transcends both marriage and bloodline. And these extendedfamily structures can take a number of forms:
One is the three-generation household, a structure that allows for pooling financial and human resources for the care
of children and the elderly, as well as for the emotional support of parents. Another is that of family members choosing
to live in separate households but close proximity to each
other, so that daily interaction is not only possible but
likely. And a third structure quite common in African American communities is that of fictive kin. Here, families
establish familial relationships with people who are not related by blood and who may or may not live with the nuclear family. Friends or neighbors are likely candidates for
fictive kin relationships and may be given kinship titles,
such as aunt or uncle. 138

132, at 10–11. Indeed, “[t]he African immediate family, consisting of a father, his
wives, and their children, is but a part of a larger unit. This immediate family is
generally recognized by Africanists as belonging to a local relationship group
termed the ‘extended family.’” ROBERT B. HILL ET AL., RESEARCH ON THE AFRICAN
AMERICAN FAMILY: A HOLISTIC PERSPECTIVE 105 (1993) (quoting MELVILLE J.
HERSKOVITS, THE MYTH OF THE NEGRO PAST 182 (1958)). Additionally, the costs
of child rearing in the extended family model of West Africa are “rarely borne
exclusively by biological parents; rather, they are shared by many people through
the extended family and other social networks.” Rebecca L. Hegar & Maria
Scannapieco, Grandma’s Babies: The Problem of Welfare Eligibility for Children
Raised by Relatives, 27 J. SOC. & SOC. WELFARE 153, 155–56 (2000) (quoting
Caroline H. Bledsoe et al., The Effect of Child Fostering on Feeding Practices and
Access to Health Services in Rural Sierra Leone, 27 SOC. SCI. & MED. 627, 627
(1988)).
136. Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 269 (1995).
137. HUNTER, supra note 128, at 309; see also Trina Jones, Single and
Childfree! Reassessing Parental and Marital Status Discrimination, 46 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 1253, 1295 (2014) (“African Americans are less likely to marry than any other
race.”).
138. Connie M. Kane, African American Family Dynamics as Perceived by
Family Members, 30 J. BLACK STUD. 691, 692–93 (2000) (citations omitted).
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Regardless of what precise form it might take, the extended family model within the African American community has
served a consistent purpose: survival or, more specifically, “the
survival of the child for the survival of the community.” 139 One
commentator has gone so far as to recognize the extended
family model as “the institution most responsible for the survival of African people in the United States.” 140 The extended
family fits into and is the result of a community where “interdependence—rather than individualism—is highly valued.” 141
In other words, the extended family model operates under a
“collectivistic philosophy” 142 in which the individual members
focus not on individual needs, but on the needs of the “family
and significant other members of the ‘family tribe.’” 143 Two specific obstacles have made the extended family model almost indispensable to African Americans: slavery and this country’s
history of discriminatory child-welfare practices.
The extended family model was crucial to surviving the
devastation that slavery inflicted upon the African American
community. As Professor Barbara Bennett Woodhouse described, “strong extended family and kin relationships were a major source of strength that helped early African-American families survive the dislocation and brutality of slavery.” 144 Slavery
was particularly destructive for children because they were
constantly at risk of being separated from their parents.145
139. Gilbert A. Holmes, The Extended Family System in the Black Community:
A Child-Centered Model for Adoption Policy, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 1649, 1660 (1995).
140. Sudarkasa, supra note 132, at 12; see also ROBERT B. HILL, NAT’L URBAN
LEAGUE RESEARCH DEP’T, INFORMAL ADOPTION AMONG BLACK FAMILIES 29
(1977) (“The institution primarily responsible for the survival and advancement of
black people from slavery to present times has been the extended family.”);
Anders Walker, Legislating Virtue: How Segregationists Disguised Racial Discrimination as Moral Reform Following Brown v. Board of Education, 47 DUKE L.J.
399, 407 (1997) (noting how “the development of black families as extended kinship networks . . . proved useful survival mechanisms for blacks facing the poverty and discrimination inherent in post-slavery America”).
141. Zachary W. Best, Derailing the Schoolhouse-to-Jailhouse Track: Title VI
and a New Approach to Disparate Impact Analysis in Public Education, 99 GEO.
L.J. 1671, 1695 (2011).
142. NANCY BOYD-FRANKLIN, BLACK FAMILIES IN THERAPY: UNDERSTANDING
THE AFRICAN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE 6 (2d ed. 2003).
143. FAYE Z. BELGRAVE & KEVIN W. ALLISON, AFRICAN AMERICAN
PSYCHOLOGY: FROM AFRICA TO AMERICA 36 (2005).
144. Woodhouse, supra note 121, at 592–93.
145. Joyce E. McConnell, Beyond Metaphor: Battered Women, Involuntary
Servitude and the Thirteenth Amendment, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 207, 220
(1992) (noting how slavery “included the constant threat and actual separation of
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Because of family separations, the extended family model, with
its “flexible boundaries where outside members can be subsumed into the formally defined family,” 146 became particularly
crucial. As one commentator describes:
When young children were sold away from their mothers or
fathers, the family acquiring them usually softened the
trauma of separation, much as we today adopt orphans or
take in foster children. A child in need of parenting attracts
foster parents. Slave families were generally available to
take in a child. On a plantation, there were several nuclear
families into which the child might be adopted. 147

This practice, known as informal adoption, “permitted thousands of black children to withstand the ordeals of slavery—after their parents had often been sold as chattel.” 148
Of course, even after slavery was abolished, African American families continued to face challenges that would further
underscore the need for extended-family networks and informal
adoptions. Specifically, African American families were generally denied access to early child-welfare programs. 149 As Dorothy Roberts has pointed out, “for a century black families had
mothers from children and other family members from one another”); David M.
Smolin, Fourteenth Amendment Unenumerated Rights Jurisprudence: An Essay in
Response to Stenberg v. Carhart, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 815, 831 (2001)
(noting the “heart-rending stories of spouses separated and children sold away
from their parents”).
146. G. Susan Mosley-Howard & Cheryl Burgan Evans, Relationships and
Contemporary Experiences of the African American Family: An Ethnographic Case
Study, 30 J. BLACK STUD. 428, 431 (2000).
147. JOHN DEWAR GLEISSNER, PRISON AND SLAVERY: A SURPRISING
COMPARISON 181 (2010).
148. HILL, supra note 140, at 22.
149. In fact, at the 1930 White House Conference on Child Health and
Protection of Dependent and Neglected Children, Dr. Ira De A. Reid presented
data outlining the discriminatory treatment that African American families were
receiving in foster and child care. The data showed that 1) African American
families were at best underrepresented and, at worst, completely excluded from
the Mother’s Aid program (a precursor to AFDC and TANF); 2) despite the higher
rates of illegitimacy that existed among African Americans, facilities that were
designed to care for illegitimate children and their unwed mothers were almost
exclusively for whites; and 3) most health-care services existed mainly to serve
whites, despite the high level of infant mortality that existed among African
Americans at the time. ANDREW BILLINGSLEY & JEANNE M. GIOVANNONI,
CHILDREN OF THE STORM: BLACK CHILDREN AND AMERICAN CHILD WELFARE 81–
85 (1972).
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no recourse to the formal child welfare system. Blacks were virtually excluded from openly segregated child welfare services
until the end of World War II.” 150 Furthermore, during
segregation, African American children were excluded from
most adoption agencies because “Jim Crow laws prevented
black children from being cared for by the institutions of white
society that tried to place orphans in adoptive homes.” 151 Of
course, “[e]ven after such discriminatory laws were dismantled,
black children were still denied access to most formal child welfare institutions because they were undesirable to white adoptive parents.” 152 In response, the extended family and the practice of informal adoption “came to the rescue of thousands of
related and non-related African American children who had no
means of support.” 153
Even today, despite the greater availability of nondiscriminatory child welfare services, the extended family model continues to help the African American community withstand the
“poverty, racism, and socioeconomic and psychological stressors” 154 that continue to prey on African American families. And
just as it did in the past, the practice of informal adoption
persists. Statistics show that in 1996, 23 percent of African
American children lived in extended families, compared with
only 10 percent of white children. 155 Similarly, recent data
from the 2010 census reveals that “[w]hile 7 percent of White,
non-Hispanic children lived with a grandparent, 12 percent of
Hispanic children and 14 percent of Black and Asian children
lived with a grandparent.” 156 Such statistics are hardly
surprising given that, as Professor Solangel Maldonado has
pointed out, while “the majority of White grandparents make a
distinction between grandparental and parental roles, [t]his
distinction exists less clearly in African-American and Latino
150. Dorothy E. Roberts, Kinship Care and the Price of State Support for
Children, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1619, 1622 (2001).
151. Christina White, Federally Mandated Destruction of the Black Family:
The Adoption and Safe Families Act, 1 NW. J.L. & SOC. POL’Y 303, 305 (2006).
152. Id.
153. Ruth G. McRoy, African American Adoptions, in CHILD WELFARE REVISITED: AN AFRICENTRIC PERSPECTIVE 256, 260 (Joyce E. Everett et al. eds., 2004).
154. Id.
155. Jacqueline Marie Smith, The Demography of African American Families
and Children at the End of the Twentieth Century, in CHILD WELFARE REVISITED,
supra note 153, at 15, 23.
156. RENEE R. ELLIS & TAVIA SIMMONS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CORESIDENT
GRANDPARENTS AND THEIR GRANDCHILDREN 8 (2014).
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families.” 157 Additionally, when compared with white and
Hispanic children, an African American child is more likely to
live with neither parent. A 2011 report from the U.S. Census
Bureau reveals that 8.7 percent of African American children
live with neither parent, compared with 3.1 percent and 4
percent for white and Hispanic children, respectively. 158
Such statistics are illuminating because children who do
not live with either parent have a much greater chance of being
informally adopted. In fact, Robert B. Hill has noted that 80
percent of African American children not living with either
parent are informally adopted. 159 For those children born to
unmarried parents, one study found that 90 percent of African
American children were raised by the extended family, in contrast with only 7 percent of white children, who were more
likely to be put up for formal adoption. 160 The number of African American children who lived with and were informally
adopted by relatives rose from 1.3 to 1.4 million between 1970
and 1979. 161 By 1990, the number had reached 1.6 million. 162
In total, it has been estimated that nearly 15 percent of African
American children are informally adopted. 163 Although more
recent statistics on the practice are difficult to locate, even the
U.S. Census Bureau acknowledged, as late as 2014, that “informal adoptions may also be more common among Hispanics
and Blacks than other race and ethnic groups.” 164

Maldonado, supra note 24, at 901.
ROSE M. KREIDER & RENEE ELLIS, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, LIVING
ARRANGEMENTS OF CHILDREN: 2009 HOUSEHOLD ECONOMIC STUDIES 4–5 (2011).
159. Robert B. Hill, Institutional Racism in Child Welfare, in CHILD WELFARE
REVISITED, supra note 153, at 57, 69.
160. HILL, supra note 140, at 23.
161. HILL, supra note 135, at 32.
162. ROBERT B. HILL, THE STRENGTHS OF AFRICAN AMERICAN FAMILIES:
TWENTY-FIVE YEARS LATER 126 (1999); see also JANET DEWART, THE STATE OF
BLACK AMERICA 55 (1989) (“[B]etween 1970 and 1987, the proportion of black
children in informally adoptive families soared from 13 percent to 17 percent.”).
163. ANDREW BILLINGSLEY, CLIMBING JACOB’S LADDER: THE ENDURING
LEGACY OF AFRICAN-AMERICAN FAMILIES 30 (1992).
164. ROSE M. KREIDER & DAPHNE A. LOFQUIST, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
ADOPTED CHILDREN AND STEPCHILDREN: 2010 POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS 2
(2014).
157.
158.
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2. Extended Family in Hispanic Communities
Within the United States, the Hispanic population is not
only the largest minority group, 165 it is also the nation’s second
fastest growing minority community. 166 In fact, between the
2000 and 2010 censuses, the Hispanic population in the United
States increased by 43 percent, compared with a 3 percent increase in the African American population and a 5.7 percent
increase in the white population. 167 Overall, it is estimated
that there are 50.5 million Hispanics living in the United
States today. 168 The term “Hispanic” is a blanket term that encompasses individuals from various regions and cultures,169
though there are some shared qualities among these distinct
communities. 170 Chief among them is the “elevation of family
over individual needs.” 171
165. See KAREN R. HUMES ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, OVERVIEW OF RACE
HISPANIC ORIGIN: 2010 CENSUS BRIEFS 4 (2011) (reporting that 16.3 percent
of the population identified as “Hispanic and Latino,” compared to 12.6 percent for
“Black or African American”).
166. See Gustavo López et al., Key Facts About Asian Americans, a Diverse and
Growing Population, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Sept. 8, 2017), http://www.pew
research.org/fact-tank/2017/09/08/key-facts-about-asian-americans/ [https://perma
.cc/GMH9-SJY3] (“The U.S. Asian population grew 72% between 2000 and 2015
(from 11.9 million to 20.4 million), the fastest growth rate of any major racial or
ethnic group. By comparison, the population of the second-fastest growing group,
Hispanics, increased 60% during the same period.”).
167. See HUMES, supra note 165, at 3–4.
168. Id.
169. See Bron B. Ingoldsby, Poverty and Patriarchy in Latin American, in
FAMILIES IN MULTICULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 335, 335 (Bron B. Ingoldsby &
Suzanna Smith eds., 1995) (“It is not possible to make accurate generalizations
about an area as large and diverse as Latin America.”); see also SHARON R. ENNIS
ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, THE HISPANIC POPULATION: 2010 CENSUS BRIEFS 5
fig.2 (2011) (reporting that, in the 2010 Census, 63 percent of the nation’s
Hispanic population identified as Mexican, 9.2 percent identified as Puerto Rican,
3.5 percent as Cuban, and the balance as “Other Hispanic,” which includes
Spanish, Dominican, and Central and South American).
170. The term “Hispanic” is generally used to refer to people of Spanish
descent, while the term “Latino/a/x” is generally used to refer to people of Latin
American descent. See generally Paul Taylor et al., When Labels Don’t Fit:
Hispanics and Their Views of Identity, PEW RESEARCH CENTER: HISPANIC
TRENDS (Apr. 4, 2012), https://www.pewhispanic.org/2012/04/04/when-labels-don’t
-fit-hispanics-and-their-views-of-identity/ [https://perma.cc/B7XK-P9RD]. This Article uses the term Hispanic inclusively to refer to people of Spanish and Latin
American descent.
171. As sociologist Alfredo Mirandé notes, “[j]ust as there is no one uniform
Anglo-American family, so there is no one [Hispanic] family but a number of
family types that vary according to region, recentness of migration to the United
States, education, social class, age, and urban-rural locale.” ALFREDO MIRANDÉ,
AND
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Not surprisingly, “the multigenerational, informal extended family” 172 plays an important role within the Hispanic community. Such family structures are frequently comprised of not
only the traditional nuclear family but also “highly integrated
extended kinship systems.” 173 These include both primary kin,
such as parents and siblings, and secondary kin, such as aunts,
uncles, cousins, grandparents, and even godparents (compadrazgos). 174 In fact, within the Hispanic community, “the presence of several generations within the same household is an
accepted norm.” 175 Specifically, studies have revealed that
whereas only 13 percent of whites live in intergenerational
homes, for Hispanics the rate is 22 percent. 176 Regardless,
within the Hispanic community, “[m]embers of the different
layers of this extended family do not have to reside in the same
household, or neighborhood for that matter, to exercise the reciprocal and mutual help functions which characterize it.” 177 To
understand the degree to which the Hispanic community treats
family and household as two distinct things, one need only look
to the Spanish language:

THE CHICANO EXPERIENCE: AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE 153 (1985). Nonetheless, there does exist a “strong, persistent familistic orientation,” or “familism,”
within the Hispanic community. Id. (“Probably the most significant characteristic
of the Chicano family is its strong emphasis on familism.”); see also Berta Esperanza Hernández-Truyol, Latina Multidimensionality and LatCrit Possibilities:
Culture, Gender, and Sex, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 811, 815 (1999) (noting that many
of the “cultural commonalities” within the Hispanic community “converge around
the importance of family”).
172. HOWARD H. IRVING & MICHAEL BENJAMIN, FAMILY MEDIATION:
CONTEMPORARY ISSUES 327 (1995).
173. Oscar Ramírez & Carlos H. Árce, The Contemporary Chicano Family: An
Empirically Based Review, in EXPLORATIONS IN CHICANO PSYCHOLOGY 3, 15
(Augustine Barón, Jr. ed., 1981).
174. Id. at 16; see also Woodhouse, supra note 121, at 591–92 (noting that,
when it comes to fictive kinship, “the religious and social institution of compadrazgo, or godparenthood, plays a crucial role”). In addition, it is not uncommon in
the Hispanic community for friends and neighbors to be “symbolically incorporated” into the family. MIRANDÉ, supra note 171, at 155.
175. José Szapocznik et al., Shenandoah: A School-Based Intervention, in A
HISPANIC-LATINO APPROACH TO SUBSTANCE ABUSE PREVENTION 171, 179 (José
Szapocznik ed., 1998).
176. See KATHERINE VAN WORMER, HUMAN BEHAVIOR AND THE SOCIAL
ENVIRONMENT: MICRO LEVEL INDIVIDUALS AND FAMILIES 273 (2010).
177. Marta Sotomayor, The Hispanic Elderly and the Intergenerational Family,
in INTERGENERATIONAL PROGRAMS: IMPERATIVES, STRATEGIES, IMPACTS, TRENDS
55, 59 (Sally Newman & Steven W. Brummel eds., 1989).
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In Spanish, the denotation of the term familia is generic.
Familia can embrace all extended family kin and single or
various combinations of individual households. Thus, when
speaking Spanish, one is usually careful to make a distinction between a reference to extended family members or
households at large (familia always) and a reference to
members of the immediate household (la casa—”house” or
“home”), which is ordinarily a nuclear-family centered
dwelling. 178

As a result, children in Hispanic families typically develop
“close bonds not only with members of the immediate family
but with grandparents, aunts and uncles, cousins, and family
friends.” 179
Just as the extended family has contributed to the survival
of the African American community, 180 the familial bonds within the Hispanic community have helped promote “economic
assistance, encouragement, and support” among its members. 181 It has done so by “emphasiz[ing] obligations of material
and emotional support to family members. In return, the individual receives family help and support to solve problems.”182
In that respect, the extended family within the Hispanic community has been described as “a problem-solving unit,” a quality that helps distinguish it from the traditional nuclear family
model. 183 As one commentator put it: “In many ways, the Hispanic family helps and supports its members to a degree far
beyond that found in individualistically oriented Anglo families.” 184
178. Jaime Sena-Rivera, Extended Kinship in the United States: Competing
Models and the Case of La Familia Chicana, 41 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 121, 123
(1979); see also MIRANDÉ, supra note 171, at 157 (“[F]or Chicanos, the distinction
between casa (household) and familia (relatives) is significant.”).
179. MIRANDÉ, supra note 171, at 155.
180. See supra notes 139–143 and accompanying text.
181. Hilary N. Weaver, Social Work Practice with Latinos, in CULTURAL
DIVERSITY AND SOCIAL WORK PRACTICE 74, 90 (Bruce A. Thyer et al. eds., 2010).
182. James Allen et al., Well-Being and Health, in COUNSELING ACROSS
CULTURES 435, 448 (Paul B. Pedersen et al. eds., 7th ed. 2015).
183. Shirley L. Patterson & Flavio Francisco Marsiglia, “Mi Casa Es Su Casa”:
Beginning Exploration of Mexican Americans’ Natural Helping, 81 FAM. SOC’Y 22,
24 (2000); see also Rosina M. Becerra, The Mexican-American Family, in ETHNIC
FAMILIES IN AMERICA: PATTERNS AND VARIATIONS 153, 161 (Charles H. Mindel et
al. eds., 4th ed. 1998) (“The family is a major support system, a unit to which the
individual may turn for help when in stress or in other types of need.”).
184. Ingoldsby, supra note 169, at 337.
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More specifically, just as the extended family model made
it easier for African Americans to weather the challenges of
slavery and discriminatory child-welfare policies, so too has it
enabled the Hispanic community to combat the unique difficulties it has faced in this country. First, the extended family has
helped Hispanic deal with the challenges of poverty. Although
poverty exists throughout the United States, “[t]he Latino family experiences more severe financial burdens than the white
American family.” 185 For instance, as of 2014, the poverty rate
for white Americans was 10.1 percent but was 23.6 percent for
Hispanic. 186 Furthermore, families headed by single mothers
constitute the majority of the poor in the United States. 187 And
in 2009, for instance, 19 percent of white children lived in
homes headed by a single mother, whereas the percentages for
Hispanic and African American children jumped to 26 percent
and 50 percent, respectively. 188 For all these reasons, some
commentators have pointed to familism within the Hispanic
community as a response to “historical conditions of economic
deprivation.” 189 After all, the extended family allows for “the
potential for an exchange of services among poor people whose
income did not provide the basis for family subsistence.” 190

185. Note, Into the Mouths of Babes: La Familia Latina and Federally Funded
Child Welfare, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1319, 1323 (1992).
186. See CARMEN DENAVAS-WALT & BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU, INCOME AND POVERTY IN THE UNITED SATES: CURRENT POPULATION
REPORTS 12–14 (2015). Recently, this trend may have even worsened. See
MATTHEW DESMOND, EVICTED: POVERTY AND PROFIT IN THE AMERICAN CITY 125
(2016) (“Between 2007 and 2010, the average white family experienced an 11 percent reduction in wealth [whereas the] average Hispanic family lost 44 percent.”).
187. See Akari Atoyama-Little, Taxing Single Mothers: A Critical Look at the
Tax Code, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2146, 2152 (2013) (“Poverty is pervasive among
single-mother households. In 2011, 40% of such households lived below the
national poverty line.” (citations omitted)); Sally F. Goldfarb, Who Pays for the
“Boomerang Generation”?: A Legal Perspective on Financial Support for Young
Adults, 37 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 45, 84 (2014) (“[S]ingle-mother families have a
higher poverty rate than any other major demographic group.”).
188. KREIDER & ELLIS, supra note 158, at 4–5, tbls.1 & 2.
189. Maxine Baca Zinn, Familism Among Chicanos: A Theoretical Review, 10
HUMBOLDT J. SOC. REL. 224, 231 (1982); see also Esme Fuller-Thomson &
Meredith Minkler, Central American Grandparents Raising Grandchildren, 29
HISP. J. BEHAV. SCI. 5, 6 (2007) (defining familism as a value system in which “all
members strongly identify with their respective family units and feel a deep sense
of family loyalty”).
190. Bonnie Thornton Dill, Fictive Kin, Paper Sons, and Compadrazgo: Women
of Color and the Struggle for Family Survival, in WOMEN OF COLOR IN U.S.
SOCIETY 149, 164 (Maxine Baca Zinn & Bonnie Thornton Dill eds., 1994).
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Second, Hispanic families are less likely than other ethnicities to avail themselves of governmental resources. This
finding seemingly stems from the fact that, “[i]n times of stress
or when problems arise, [Hispanics] typically [turn] to the
family for help rather than to outside agencies.” 191 To explain
this underutilization of formal resources, scholars have offered
three rationales: lack of awareness that these benefits even
exist, 192 the inevitable difficulties that arise when communicating with governmental employees, 193 and the general distrust many Hispanics have for governmental agencies. 194 Regardless of the reason, Hispanics within the United States simply rely less on formal resources like governmental benefits
and more on informal resources like the extended family. Specifically, studies show that members of the extended family can
typically be counted on to provide services like “labor, . . . sickbed care, personal advice with problems, and transportation.” 195
Even in the area of childcare, the extended family tends to
provide the majority of support. In fact, a tenet in Hispanic culture is that children are primarily cared for by the family. 196 As
one commentator describes: “Because of family values, mothers
are expected to stay home and raise children, so young Latino
children are less likely to be in early care and education set191. MIRANDÉ, supra note 171, at 151–52.
192. Joan W. Moore, Mexican Americans and Cities: A Study in Migration and
the Use of Formal Resources, 5 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 292, 295 (1971).
193. Id. at 294–95 (referring to this as “culture conflict”); see also Luz M. López
et al., Group Work with Immigrants and Refugees, in GROUP WORK WITH
POPULATIONS AT RISK 201, 209 (Geoffrey Greif & Carolyn Knight eds., 4th ed.
2016) (noting the demand among the Hispanic community for “culturally sensitive
and bilingual social workers in all 50 states who are proficient in culturally
specific group interventions”).
194. Erin Lovejoy, Taking Advantage of Laws, Not People: Curbing Language
Discrimination Against Texas Consumers, 69 BAYLOR L. REV. 437, 460 (2017)
(noting “Hispanics’ distrust of government-sponsored activities”); Jenny Rivera,
An Equal Protection Standard for National Origin Subclassifications: The Context
that Matters, 82 WASH. L. REV. 897, 965 n.91 (2007) (noting “Latino distrust of
government”).
195. M. Jean Gilbert, Extended Family Integration Among Second-Generation
Mexican Americans, in FAMILY AND MENTAL HEALTH IN THE MEXICAN AMERICAN
COMMUNITY 25, 40 (J. Manuel Casas & Susan E. Keefe eds., 1978).
196. See Maldonado, supra note 24, at 907 (“[A]lthough most parents needing
full-time childcare prefer a grandparent over any other in-home caretaker, this is
especially true in African-American and Latino families where grandmothers who
are homemakers tend to care for their grandchildren from infancy until school
age.”).
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tings. When this is not possible, extended family frequently
takes over the care of young children.” 197 In some instances,
this reliance on the extended family goes beyond daily childcare to temporary child placement and informal adoption. In
terms of temporary child placement, Michael Benjamin notes
that “in times of crisis, family boundaries are sufficiently flexible and the norms of mutual support (confianza en confianza)
sufficiently strong to sanction child lending.” 198 This process of
child lending is far from unusual, having instead been referred
to by experts as both “common within families of color” 199 and
“the easy and frequent transferring of excess children from one
nuclear family to another, within a structure of blood and ritual kin.” 200
When a child is in need of a permanent placement in a new
home within the Hispanic community, there exists a strong cultural aversion to formal adoption. 201 Interestingly, one study
found that when compared to African Americans and whites,
Hispanic women are much less likely to formally adopt a
child. 202 This preference has been attributed to a number of obstacles faced by Hispanics, including “lack of information, financial resources, and bilingual workers,” 203 longer wait times
for a child, 204 and even the degree to which adoption might
197. PENNY DEINER, INCLUSIVE EARLY CHILDHOOD EDUCATION: DEVELOPMENT, RESOURCES, AND PRACTICE 32 (Mark Kerr et al. eds., 6th ed. 2012).
198. MICHAEL BENJAMIN, CULTURAL DIVERSITY, EDUCATIONAL EQUITY AND
THE TRANSFORMATION OF HIGHER EDUCATION 56–57 (1996).
199. MICHAEL REISCH & CHARLES D. GARVIN, SOCIAL WORK AND SOCIAL
JUSTICE: CONCEPTS, CHALLENGES, AND STRATEGIES 159 (2016).
200. J. Mayone Stycos, Family and Fertility in Puerto Rico, 17 AM. SOC. REV.

572, 577 (1952) (emphasis added). Of particular importance in this area is the
godparent, or compadrazgo, an example of a fictive kinship in which there exists
“a core relational commitment between the child and sponsor as well as between
the sponsor and the child’s parents.” Woodhouse, supra note 121, at 592. The
compadrazgo is charged with taking care “of the physical and spiritual needs of
the child in the event that the parents could not perform these essential duties.”
NORMA WILLIAMS, THE MEXICAN AMERICAN FAMILY: TRADITION AND CHANGE 26–
27 (1990).
201. See Maria Suarez Hamm, NAT’L COUNCIL FOR ADOPTION, Latino Adoption
Issues, in ADOPTION FACTBOOK III, at 257–58 (Connaught Marshner ed., 1999)
(noting the cultural bias against formal adoption).
202. Kathy S. Stolley, Statistics on Adoption in the United States, 3 FUTURE
CHILD. 26, 37–38 (1993).
203. Robert S. Bausch & Richard T. Serpe, Recruiting Mexican American
Adoptive Parents, 78 CHILD WELFARE 693, 706 (1999).
204. Id. at 698 (noting that some agency criteria have the effect of screening
out minority families).
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threaten “the masculinity of Latino males.” 205 Most notably,
there is again the strong sense of familism that exists in the
Hispanic communities, part of which includes the practice of
“stepping in when close relatives are not able to raise their
child.” 206 In fact, in a survey of Hispanic couples who chose not
to adopt, over 50 percent indicated that the belief that the family should care for a child in need was either “very” or “somewhat important” to their ultimate decision to forgo adoption. 207
In light of these attitudes and predispositions away from
formal adoption, rates of informal adoption among the Hispanic
community are relatively high. 208 Even the U.S. Census Bureau has noted that informal adoptions are higher in African
American and Hispanic communities. 209 To better understand
how informal adoption operates in practice, consider this description by J. Mayone Stycos, who studied the practice in
Puerto Rico:
At the death of the father or mother of a family, it is quite
usual in rural areas for the members to be dispersed to kin
or ritual kin, but such a family crisis is hardly needed for
the adoption of children. For example, a very young child
may be sent to live with a relative or friend who is better off
economically, or to live with grandparents who may be
lonely. The latter will informally adopt the child, feed and
clothe it, and in return may expect it to assist in the housework. 210

205. Id. at 706. In essence, the fear is that adoption could be taken to mean
either that the natural father is incapable of providing for the child or that the
adopting father is infertile, two impressions that could undermine a male’s
machismo. BENJAMIN, supra note 198, at 58; see also Judith L. Gibbons et al.,
Gender Attitudes Mediate Gender Differences in Attitudes Toward Adoption in
Guatemala, 54 SEX ROLES 139, 142 (2006) (“[T]hose who hold machismo beliefs
have more negative beliefs about adoption.”).
206. J.D. Cooley, Baby Girl’s Fate: Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl—Placing a
Child’s Chosen Parental Path in the Hands of the United States Supreme Court, 8
S.J. POL’Y & JUST. L.J. 99, 131 (2014).
207. Bausch & Serpe, supra note 203, at 707 tbl.3.
208. Id. at 701 (noting the “cultural preference for informal rather than formal
adoption”).
209. ROSE M. KREIDER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, ADOPTED CHILDREN AND
STEPCHILDREN: CENSUS 2000 SPECIAL REPORT 3 (2003) (“Informal adoptions are
also more common among Blacks and Hispanics.”).
210. Stycos, supra note 200, at 578.
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Stycos further noted that these informal adoptions can last
“from months to life.” 211 When it comes to Hispanic children
who have been informally adopted, Professor Melba SánchezAyéndez notes that they “are generally treated by their adoptive parents as though they were their own and that their status within the household is like that of the other children of the
parents,” and that, even when no legal adoption was involved,
these children nonetheless “know that the family and home of
the adoptive parents is their own.” 212
In sum, although the Hispanic and African American communities are by no means the only communities to use the extended family model or informal adoption, these practices in
both communities show that many families in the United
States simply do not conform to the traditional nuclear family
model. Further, the extended family model is not the result of
some arbitrary choice but is instead, in many ways, a response
to the oppressive forces African American and Hispanic communities have encountered in the United States. 213
Decision makers in state governments must keep the extended family model in mind—along with the evolving nuclear
family discussed earlier 214—if their goal is to enact laws that
are not only fully representative of the American family but
also truly protective of children, who of course the state, as
parens patriae, has a responsibility to protect. 215

211. Id.; see also Jill E. Korbin, Child Maltreatment in Cross-Cultural
Perspective: Vulnerable Children and Circumstances, in CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT: BIOSOCIAL DIMENSIONS 31, 44 (Richard J. Gelles & Jane B. Lancaster
eds., 1987) (“Mechanisms such as child lending, fostering, and informal adoption
all redistribution of children on a temporary or permanent basis.”).
212. Melba Sánchez-Ayéndez, The Puerto Rican Family, in ETHNIC FAMILIES
IN AMERICA: PATTERNS AND VARIATIONS 199, 204 (Charles H. Mindel et al. eds.,
4th ed. 1998).
213. See supra notes 139–154, 180–195 and accompanying text.
214. See supra Section I.A.
215. Claire Houston, What Ever Happened to the “Child Maltreatment
Revolution”?, 19 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 1, 5 (2017) (“[T]he state has the responsibility and the right to protect those who cannot protect themselves, including
children.”); Maxine Eichner, Dependency and the Liberal Polity: On Martha
Fineman’s The Autonomy Myth, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1285, 1313–14 (2005) (“Few
would disagree that the state has some responsibility to protect and defend its
most vulnerable citizens—children, the elderly, and other dependents—when they
cannot protect themselves.”).
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II. PARENTS, CHILDREN, AND THE CONSTITUTION
As discussed earlier, state courts are confronting the fact
that the role of “parent” is increasingly occupied by individuals
other than legal parents. 216 Becuase the purpose of this Article
is to explore the legal lacuna that exists regarding the protections afforded quasi-parents, it is important to understand the
nature and strength of the constitutional rights that attach to
parentage. Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly
addressed the rights of quasi-parents under the Constitution, it
has issued a number of decisions dealing with the rights of legal parents—rights that, as this Part explores, seemingly provide a basis for quasi-parents to claim at least some parental
rights.
Initially, it is important to note that the Court did not issue any opinion on the topic of parental rights until the
1920s. 217 Prior to that, a number of state courts had granted
parental rights over the objections of a child’s legal parents to
someone who had acted as the child’s parent. For instance, in
1881, the Supreme Court of Kansas, in an opinion described as
“a prototype of cases in which nonparents claim to have established parentlike relationships,” 218 awarded custody to a child’s
aunt over the objections of the child’s father. 219 The child was
born to a mother who was ill and a father who was “penniless.” 220 Five-and-a-half years after entrusting the child to his
wife’s sister, the father, who at no point was deemed unfit,
sought to reclaim the child. 221 In a unanimous opinion written
by future U.S. Supreme Court justice David Brewer, the Kansas Supreme Court ordered that the child remain with the
aunt:
[T]he child has had, and has to-day, all that a mother’s love
and care can give. The affection which a mother may have
and does have, springing from the fact that a child is her
offspring, is an affection which perhaps no other one can re-

216. See supra Part I.
217. See infra notes 233–242 and accompanying text.
218. Marcia O’Kelly, Blessing the Tie that Binds: Preference for the Primary
Caretaker as Custodian, 63 N.D. L. REV. 481, 560 n.259 (1987).
219. Chapsky v. Wood, 26 Kan. 650, 658 (1881).
220. Id. at 654–55.
221. Id. at 655.
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ally possess; but so far as it is possible, springing from years
of patient care of a little, helpless babe, from association,
and as an outgrowth from those little cares and motherly
attentions bestowed upon it, an affection for the child is
seen in Mrs. Wood that can be found nowhere else. And it is
apparent, that so far as a mother’s love can be equaled, its
foster-mother has that love, and will continue to have it. 222

The court reached this conclusion despite its recognition that
“[t]he father is the natural guardian and is prima facie entitled
to the custody of his minor child [and] cannot, by merely giving
away his child, release himself from the obligation to support
it, nor be deprived of the right to its custody.” 223 Nonetheless,
the court also pointed out that “[i]t is an obvious fact, that ties
of blood weaken, and ties of companionship strengthen, by
lapse of time.” 224
Similarly, a Virginia court in 1886 awarded custody to a
nonparent over the parent’s objection, announcing that “in all
cases the interest and welfare of the child is the great leading
object to be obtained.” 225 The case was Merritt v. Swimley, in
which a father placed his youngest child with the child’s maternal aunt following the death of the child’s mother. 226 Thirteen years later, the father sought to regain custody. 227 Although noting that, generally, a father is entitled to the custody
of his children, the court pointed out that:
[T]here may be cases where the reputation of the father is
stainless; he may not be afflicted with the slightest mental,
moral or physical disqualification from superintending the
general welfare of the infant . . . and yet the interests of the

222. Id. at 657. Comparing the aunt to the women who would help care for the
child if the father were awarded custody, the court observed: “On the other hand,
if she goes to the house of her father’s family, the female inmates are an aunt, just
ripening into womanhood, and a grandmother; they have never seen the child;
they have no affection for it springing from years of companionship.” Id.
223. Id. at 652.
224. Id. at 653.
225. Merritt v. Swimley, 82 Va. 433, 437 (1886).
226. Id. at 434.
227. Id. During those thirteen years, “he ha[d] only seen her two or three
times, and ha[d] never seen her at all except when called to Virginia on business
connected with her mother’s property.” Id.
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child may imperatively demand the denial of the father’s
right. 228

According to the court, the question then was “not what are the
rights of the father or the other relative to the custody of the
child, or whether the right of the one be superior to that of the
other, but what are the rights of the child?” 229 Given the child’s
attachment to her aunt, the court denied the father’s petition. 230
These cases, and others like them, 231 reveal two things.
First, quasi-parenthood is a social phenomenon that courts
have had to contend with for some time. Second, these decisions suggest that, historically, state courts did not regard legal
parentage, including biological and adoptive parents, as having
a monopoly on parental rights. 232 Of course, there is a question
as to how these cases comport with modern U.S. Supreme
Court jurisprudence given that they were decided before parental rights were constitutionalized by the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court first considered parental rights in
Meyer v. Nebraska, a 1925 case involving a Nebraska statute
that prohibited teaching “any subject to any person in any language [other] than the English language.” 233 The Court treated

228. Id. at 437.
229. Id. at 439–40.
230. Id. at 440.
231. See, e.g., United States v. Green, 26 F. Cas. 30, 31 (C.C.D.R.I. 1824);
Wilcox v. Wilcox, 14 N.Y. 575, 576 (1856); Clark v. Bayer, 32 Ohio St. 299 (1877);
Coffee v. Black, 82 Va. 567 (1886); Green v. Campbell, 14 S.E. 212 (W. Va. 1891).
232. As one commentator has characterized the law from this era on this topic:
“Treating parenthood as a trusteeship rather than a proprietary right, judges
developed innovative policies and set new standards for parental behavior that
took into consideration the needs of the child and society. Although biological
rights remained important, parental supremacy was no longer unchallengeable.”
PETER W. BARDAGLIO, RECONSTRUCTING THE HOUSEHOLD: FAMILIES, SEX, AND
THE LAW IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY SOUTH 165 (Thomas A. Green & Hendrik
Hartog eds., 1995). Jeffrey Shulman writes that “though his observations are
regionally based, Bardaglio provides a fair assessment of judicial developments
throughout the country.” SHULMAN, supra note 29, at 55.
233. 262 U.S. 390, 396 (1923). The rationale behind the law, as laid out by the
lower court and adopted by the Supreme Court, was largely the anti-German
xenophobia so prevalent during the post-World War I era. Id. As the Court noted,
“[t]he obvious purpose of this statute was that the English language should be
and become the mother tongue of all children reared in this state.” Id. at 398. The
Court also acknowledged that “the foreign born population is very large, that
certain communities commonly use foreign words, follow foreign leaders, move in
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the case as primarily one concerning language rights and, on
that basis, struck down the law in question. 234 In its ruling, the
Court acknowledged that the Due Process Clause “[w]ithout
doubt . . . denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint, but
also the right of the individual to[, among other things,] establish a home and bring up children.” 235 Despite the fleeting nature of its reference to parental rights, Meyer is regarded as
one of the foundational cases establishing the fundamental
right of parents. 236
Meyer began earning that legacy just two years later, when
the Court relied on it to support its holding in Pierce v. Society
of Sisters. 237 There, the Court was confronted with an Oregon
statute requiring all children to attend public school. 238 A private educational organization brought suit on the grounds that
the law “conflicted with the right of parents to choose schools
where their children will receive appropriate mental and religious training.” 239 Just as it had done in Meyer, the Court
struck down the challenged legislation. This time the Court
was more explicit in basing its ruling on parental rights, holding that the law in question “unreasonably interferes with the
liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control.” 240 According to the
Court, the Due Process Clause “excludes any general power of
the State to standardize its children by forcing them to accept
instruction from public teachers only.” 241 Instead, in an oftquoted passage, the Court made clear that parents retained the
a foreign atmosphere, and that the children are thereby hindered from becoming
citizens of the most useful type and the public safety is imperiled.” Id. at 401.
234. Id. at 401. “The protection of the Constitution extends to all, to those who
speak other languages as well as to those born with English on the tongue.” The
Court noted that “it would be highly advantageous if all had ready understanding
of our ordinary speech, but this cannot be coerced by methods which conflict with
the Constitution.” Id.
235. Id.
236. See Meyer, supra note 14, at 533 (describing Meyer as one of “the
foundational family privacy cases”); see also Samuel A. Gunsburg, Frozen Life’s
Dominion: Extending Reproductive Autonomy Rights to in Vitro Fertilization, 65
FORDHAM L. REV. 2205, 2235 (1997) (“The Supreme Court decision which
established the foundation for the contemporary right to privacy was Meyer v.
Nebraska . . . .”).
237. 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925).
238. Id. at 530.
239. Id. at 532.
240. Id. at 534.
241. Id.
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right to make such decisions: “The child is not the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct his destiny
have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and
prepare him for additional obligations.” 242
Over the years, the Court increasingly invoked Meyer and
Pierce as evidence of its historical recognition of the fundamental rights of parents. In 1944, for instance, the Court cited both
cases, stating that “[i]t is cardinal with us that the custody,
care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose
primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.” 243 Likewise, in
1997, the Court relied on Meyer and Pierce, stating:
In a long line of cases, we have held that . . . the ‘liberty’
specially protected by the Due Process Clause includes the
rights to marry; to have children; to direct the education and
upbringing of one’s children; to marital privacy: to use contraception; to bodily integrity and to abortion. 244

By the time of Troxel, Justice O’Connor even cited the two
cases to support her sweeping declaration that this right of
parents “is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court.” 245
Importantly, Troxel marked the first and only time the
Court would address the rights of a child’s parents vis-á-vis
third-party caregivers in the child’s life. 246 There, the Court
was asked to determine the constitutionality of Washington’s
third-party visitation statute, which permitted “[a]ny person
[to] petition the court for visitation rights at any time.” 247 In
Troxel, the paternal grandparents had used this law to gain
242. Id.
243. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). Prince involved a
woman who was convicted of violating child labor laws by permitting her niece
(for whom she served as the legal guardian) to proselytize on the streets. Id. at
161–62. In upholding the conviction, the Court rejected her claim that the law
infringed upon her rights as a parent, noting that such rights are not “beyond
limitation.” Id. at 166.
244. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (emphasis added)
(internal citations omitted).
245. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000).
246. Blixt v. Blixt, 774 N.E.2d 1052, 1056 (Mass. 2002) (describing Troxel as
“the only case thus far decided by that Court on Federal due process (but not
equal protection) implications of grandparent visitation statutes”).
247. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 61 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3)).
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visitation of their grandchildren, which their daughter-in-law
had attempted to limit following the death of their son. 248 In a
plurality decision, the Court struck down the statute on the basis of its “sweeping breadth.” 249 After all, the statute did not require that the child’s parent be unfit and “it gave no special
weight at all to [the mother’s] determination of her daughters’
best interests.” 250 Thus, the Court held that as applied to the
mother, the Washington statute “violated her due process right
to make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of
her daughters.” 251 The Court left for another day the question
of “whether the Due Process Clause requires all nonparental
visitation statutes to include a showing of harm or potential
harm to the child as a condition precedent to granting visitation.” 252 In other words, the Court did not address “the precise
scope of the parental due process right in the visitation context.” 253 What Troxel did do, however, is make clear that a parent’s right, vis-á-vis the child, is not absolute.
The Court has frequently stated that parents have a fundamental right to direct the upbringing of their children.254
Constitutional scholars have long questioned whether the
Court’s opinions in Meyer and Pierce truly support such statements. As Jeffrey Shulman has argued, Meyer and Pierce “sustained only the limited proposition that neither parent nor
state enjoyed absolute authority over the child.” 255 Instead,
“they stand for a much more modest proposition: . . . the state
cannot prohibit parents from teaching their children subject
matter outside the scope of a state-mandated curriculum or
from teaching them outside the public school system.” 256 Professor Emily Buss agrees, noting that both cases were a prod248. Id. at 60–61.
249. Id. at 73 (describing the statute as conferring “broad, unlimited power”).
250. Id. at 69; see also id. at 58 (“In effect, it placed on Granville the burden of
disproving that visitation would be in her daughters’ best interest and thus failed
to provide any protection for her fundamental right.”).
251. Id. at 75.
252. Id. at 73.
253. Id. The Court did note that “[i]n this respect, we agree with Justice
Kennedy that the constitutionality of any standard for awarding visitation turns
on the specific manner in which that standard is applied and that the constitutional protections in this area are best elaborated with care.” Id. (internal
quotes omitted).
254. See supra notes 243–245 and accompanying text.
255. SHULMAN, supra note 29, at 108.
256. Id. at 101.
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uct of the Lochner era and, as such, are cases where “the
Court’s recognition of parental rights was incidental to its consideration of the economic liberty claims of educators.” 257 Nonetheless, Buss concedes that “the Court routinely cites to these
cases to demonstrate its long and consistent support for parental rights.” 258
Scholars also question whether the Court’s use of the word
“fundamental” is an accurate description of the right at issue.
After all, fundamental rights typically trigger strict scrutiny.259
Yet, in neither Meyer nor Pierce did the Court employ such
scrutiny; the Court merely employed a reasonableness test. 260
Although “Meyer and Pierce were decided before the Supreme
Court had delineated degrees of constitutional scrutiny,” 261 the
Court’s rationales in both cases nonetheless reveal “little of the
rigor of heightened review.” 262 Instead, what Professor David

257. Buss, supra note 8, at 655. Nonetheless, Buss concedes that “parental
rights survived the collapse of the Lochner era doctrine that produced them.” Id.
258. Id. at 655–56. Accordingly, Buss argues that “[t]he doctrine’s survival on
this arguably shaky foundation is itself an odd testament to the doctrine’s
strength.” Id. at 656.
259. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267, 394 n.407 (1998) (“Strict scrutiny
applies to laws infringing or unequally burdening fundamental rights and those
employing suspect classifications such as race.”); Richard A. Epstein, The
Supreme Court, 1987 Term—Foreword: Unconstitutional Conditions, State Power,
and the Limits of Consent, 102 HARV. L. REV. 4, 28 (1988) (identifying the
appropriate levels of constitutional review as “minimal scrutiny for ordinary
rights, strict scrutiny for fundamental rights and suspect classifications”).
260. See, e.g., Stephen G. Gilles, On Educating Children: A Parentalist
Manifesto, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 937, 1003 (1996) (noting how “the early substantive
due process decisions in Pierce and Meyer . . . support . . . a ‘reasonableness’ test”).
261. SHULMAN, supra note 29, at 108; see also Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer
Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 533 (1st Cir. 1995) (“[T]he Meyer and Pierce cases were
decided well before the current ‘right to privacy’ jurisprudence was
developed . . . .”); Carmen Green, Educational Empowerment: A Child’s Right to
Attend Public School, 103 GEO. L.J. 1089, 1127 (2015) (“Meyer and Pierce were
both decided before the strict scrutiny test was articulated in the 1930s.”).
262. SHULMAN, supra note 29, at 108; see also Kyle Still, Smith’s Hybrid Rights
Doctrine and the Pierce Right: An Unintelligent Design, 85 N.C. L. REV. 385, 396
(2006) (“Furthermore, as in Meyer, the Court in Pierce used the language of
rational basis, [and as such,] . . . Meyer and Pierce are distinct from cases dealing
with other fundamental rights, which generally are treated with strict scrutiny.”);
Haley J. Conard, The Constitutionality of Teacher Certification Requirements for
Home-Schooling Parents: Why the Original Rachel L. Decision Was Valid, 2
DREXEL L. REV. 206, 223 (2009) (“Although Meyer and Pierce did become ‘the
cornerstone’ of the Supreme Court’s personal liberties decisions of the 1960s and
1970s, the Court proceeded with caution rather than granting parents broad
authority when applying Meyer and Pierce in their original educational context.”).
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Meyer describes as “[t]he improvisational nature of the Court’s
family privacy jurisprudence” 263 has resulted in decisions that
are “difficult to square neatly with the traditional strict-scrutiny formula.” 264
In many ways, then, Troxel confirmed what legal scholars
have long suspected about the Court’s standard of review in
parental-rights cases. If the mother in Troxel had a fundamental right to direct the upbringing of her children—a right entitled to strict scrutiny—the Washington statute would almost
clearly have been unconstitutional. Rather than strike down
the Washington statute on the basis that it was not narrowly
tailored to further a compelling state interest, however, the
Court relied on the degree to which the statute interfered with
the parent’s rights, implying that some interference might be
constitutionally permissible. As one lower court, attempting to
apply Troxel, pointed out: “Justice O’Connor mentions ‘heightened protection’ for ‘certain fundamental rights and liberty interests’ but does not explicitly indicate strict scrutiny as the
appropriate standard of review for evaluating non-parental
visitation statutes.” 265 At least one commentator has characterized Troxel as offering “only constrained support for parental
rights.” 266 Nonetheless, a burning question remains—just how
strong are those parental rights? And are they strong enough
to thwart any attempt by the state to grant parental rights to a
quasi-parent?
III. POST-TROXEL CONFUSION
Viewed narrowly, Troxel involved grandparent visitation,
but more broadly, the case dealt with third-party claims that
contravene the wishes of a child’s legal parent(s). 267 It is no
surprise then that state courts have relied on Troxel to help
263. Meyer, supra note 14, at 533.
264. Id. at 589.
265. In re G.P.C., 28 S.W.3d 357, 365 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).
266. Buss, supra note 8, at 639. Justice Thomas, who concurred in Troxel,
pointed out this very issue: “The opinions of the plurality, Justice Kennedy, and
Justice Souter recognize [the fundamental right of parents], but curiously none of
them articulates the appropriate standard of review.” 530 U.S. at 80 (Thomas, J.,
concurring).
267. Bell, supra note 24, at 226 (“Only on the surface, however, is Troxel a
grandparents’ rights case. Its lasting importance lies in the Supreme Court’s
examination of the child-parent-state relationship.”).
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them decide cases involving claims by quasi-parents. As illustrated below, there is much confusion as to what exactly the
Court held. Consider, for instance, the words of the Supreme
Court of Utah when it attempted to apply Troxel:
[Troxel] yielded little guidance for lower courts going forward. From Troxel we know that parents have a fundamental right to make decisions about visitation, that their decisions are entitled to “special weight,” and that the presumption in favor of their decisions may not be overridden by a
“mere disagreement” over a child’s best interests. But we
know little more than that. We do not have a clear statement of the operative standard of scrutiny—and thus no
way to know exactly how much “special weight” the parent’s
decision gets or what kind of proof is required to overcome
it. 268

But apply it the state courts must, and given Troxel’s unanswered questions, state courts have reached very different conclusions on the question of quasi-parenthood.
Most states have concluded that Troxel mandates strict
scrutiny of any state action that interferes with parental
rights. For instance, in the 2006 case SooHoo v. Johnson, the
Supreme Court of Minnesota was confronted with a case where
a woman sought visitation with the two children of her former
same-sex partner. 269 Nancy SooHoo and Marilyn Johnson were
together for twenty-two years, lived together, and even owned a
home together. 270 During their relationship, Johnson adopted
two children. 271 Although SooHoo did not formally adopt either
child, “the record indicate[d] that Johnson and SooHoo coparented the children, recognized themselves as a family unit

268. Jones v. Jones, 359 P.3d 603, 608 (Utah 2015) (ultimately concluding
“that the high court’s recognition of a ‘fundamental’ right of a parent to regulate
the visitation of a child implies a standard of strict scrutiny,” which in turn
“requires a party seeking to override a parent’s decision on visitation to present
concrete proof that a visitation order is narrowly tailored to advance a compelling
government interest”).
269. 731 N.W.2d 815, 818 (Minn. 2015).
270. Id.
271. Id. (“During the course of that relationship, Johnson adopted two children
from China. When Johnson adopted the first child, both she and SooHoo traveled
to China. When Johnson adopted the second child, SooHoo remained in Minneapolis and cared for the first child while Johnson went to China.”).
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with two mothers, and represented themselves to others as
such.” 272 Subsequently, the relationship between Johnson and
SooHoo ended, and SooHoo—over Johnson’s objections—sought
visitation with the two children. 273 The relevant statute provided that a third party “who resided in a household with a child
for two or more years but no longer resides with the child, may
petition the court for an order granting reasonable visitation
with the child.” 274
The Supreme Court of Minnesota first noted that “the Supreme Court in Troxel did not articulate the standard of review
to be applied when reviewing third party visitation statutes.” 275 Nonetheless, the court applied strict scrutiny: “Strict
scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review when fundamental rights are at issue and . . . the Court has declared that a
parent’s right to make decisions concerning the care, custody,
and control of his or her children is a protected fundamental
right.” 276 Applying that standard, the court acknowledged that
the Minnesota law was much more tailored than the
Washington law at issue in Troxel. 277 Nonetheless, the court
struck down the third-party visitation statute as unconstitutional because the Minnesota law put “the burden on the
custodial parent to prove that visitation would interfere with

272. Id. As the court explained:
For example, SooHoo took maternity leave to care for both children upon
their arrival in the United States. SooHoo also participated in the
selection of child-care providers and schools for the children and shared
in the daily parenting responsibilities, including dropping off and picking
up the children from day care, helping with school projects and homework, preparing meals for the family, taking the children to doctors
appointments (including authorizing the children’s immunizations), coordinating extracurricular activities and play dates, providing the sole care
while Johnson was away on business, and taking the children to California to visit SooHoo’s extended family, all without apparent objection by
Johnson. The record further reflects that the children referred to SooHoo
as “mommy,” and referred to SooHoo’s parents as their grandparents.
Id. at 818–19.
273. Id. at 819.
274. Id. at 819–20 (citing MINN. STAT. § 257C.08(4)).
275. Id. at 821.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 822 (“The Washington statute [in Troxel] allowed courts to award
visitation to any person at any time so long as it was in the child’s best interests.
In contrast, [the Minnesota law] limits the class of individuals who may petition
for visitation to those persons who have resided with the child for two years or
more.”).
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the parent-child relationship.” 278 According to the court, “[t]he
parent’s fundamental right . . . carries with it the presumption
that the parent is acting in the best interest of the child and
requires deference to the parent’s wishes. Accordingly, placing
the burden on the parent to prove no interference violates that
fundamental right.” 279
A number of courts, even while purportedly applying strict
scrutiny, have used Troxel to reach very different answers to
the question of “exactly what compelling state interests subordinate the substantive due process rights and attendant presumptions accorded a fit, legal parent in a dispute with a nonparent over parental responsibilities.” 280 For instance, in
contrast to the Minnesota decision, a Colorado court used
Troxel to reach the opposite conclusion in a case involving very
similar facts—a case the court described as one that “illustrates the evolving nature of parenthood.” 281 The case in question was from 2004 and involved Cheryl Ann Clark and Elsey
Maxwell McLeod, who were in a committed relationship for
eleven years. 282 Although the two never married, they did discuss having children together, eventually settling on adoption,
with Clark adopting a child from China. 283 Because China
would not permit adoption by same-sex couples, the adoption
was by Clark only. 284 Nonetheless, the two traveled together to
China to bring the child home and subsequently represented
themselves publicly as the child’s two parents. 285 Six years after the adoption, the relationship between Clark and McLeod

278. Id. at 824.
279. Id. (internal citations omitted).
280. In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 557 (Colo. App. 2004).
281. Id. at 548.
282. Id. at 549. Additionally, the two “owned a home in joint tenancy [and] had
a commitment ceremony.” Id.
283. Id.
284. Id. (“The social worker who performed the background check for the
adoption indicated China would not permit an adoption by a same-sex couple. For
this reason, the adoption papers were made out in the name of Clark alone.”).
285. Id. For example, the adoption announcement stated: “[E.L.M.C.] was born
in the Hunan providence [sic] of the People’s Republic of China. She lived the first
six months of her life in the Yue Yang Children’s Welfare Home in Yue Yang,
China. She now lives with two adoring moms.” Id.
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ended. 286 When Clark attempted to limit McLeod’s visitation
with the child, McLeod petitioned for equal parenting time. 287
In ruling, the Colorado Court of Appeals initially held that
laws of this sort were subject to strict scrutiny. 288 Nonetheless,
the court held that McLeod, despite being neither a natural nor
adoptive parent, was a psychological parent, which the state
defined as “someone other than a biological parent who develops a parent-child relationship with a child through day-to-day
interaction, companionship, and caring for the child.” 289 In
light of that recognition, and concerned with the harm that
would befall the child should McLeod’s visitation be terminated, the court granted McLeod’s petition, awarding her joint
parental responsibilities over the child. 290 The court relied on
Troxel to support its decision, holding that parental unfitness is
not required and “even the existence of a developed biological
parent-child relationship will not prevent nonparents from acquiring parental rights vis-á-vis the child.” 291
As these cases (and many others) 292 demonstrate, without
clear guidance from the Supreme Court, the states have extrapolated from Troxel a variety of divergent principles regarding the rights of quasi-parents. That result is, in and of itself, problematic given that “it is the nature of a constitution to
286. Id. at 550.
287. Id. Specifically, “Clark sought to restrict McLeod to ten overnights per
month in 2003 and six overnights per month in 2004, and to terminate all courtordered parenting time in 2005.” Id.
288. Id. at 552 (“[C]onsistent with Troxel’s acknowledgment that this right ‘is
perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by [the] Court,’
we join those courts that have concluded the strict scrutiny test applies to statutes
which infringe on the parent-child relationship.” (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530
U.S. 57, 65 (2000)) (internal citations omitted)).
289. Id. at 559 (quoting In re Marriage of Martin, 42 P.3d 75, 77–78 (Colo. App.
2002)).
290. Id. at 562 (“Accordingly, we conclude that, in light of the overwhelming
evidence showing McLeod had become a psychological parent, whom E.L.M.C.
recognized almost from birth, the curtailment and later termination of McLeod’s
parental responsibilities in Clark’s proposed parenting plan threatened emotional
harm to E.L.M.C.”).
291. Id. at 556.
292. See, e.g., McGovern v. McGovern, 33 P.3d 506, 509 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2001)
(noting how “the lack of any majority opinion in Troxel complicates the resolution
of these issues”); In re Marriage of Winczewski, 72 P.3d 1012, 1056 (Or. Ct. App.
2003) (noting how “the various opinions in Troxel prevented the Court from
speaking with a clear and unified voice”); In Interest of H.S., 550 S.W.3d 151, 175
(Tex. 2018) (pointing to Troxel as an example of how “the Supreme Court has not
described the contours of the [fundamental rights of parents] with clarity”).
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set outer limits to legislative competence.” 293 It is not, however,
the purpose of this Article to dictate what that standard should
be. After all, as noted earlier, the issue is an extremely complex
one with many ancillary questions, each of which presents
challenging issues of its own. 294 Instead, the goal of this Article
is more modest—one that arises from the unfortunate reality
that, in the nearly twenty years since Troxel was decided, neither the courts nor the state legislatures have recognized the
full scope of the problem.
When it comes to quasi-parenthood, the states have spent
so much time attempting to give life to what little the Court
said in Troxel about quasi-parenthood that they have lost sight
of an important fact—namely, that whatever standard the law
ultimately settles on regarding the rights of parents vis-á-vis
third parties, it cannot be premised on the traditional nuclear
family model. That model is unrealistic, outdated, and quite
simply fails to represent the reality of contemporary American
life. In other words, the law in this area has followed a path
that Justice Kennedy warned against in his Troxel dissent
when he noted that his “principal concern” was the use of “the
conventional nuclear family . . . to establish the visitation
standard for every domestic relations case.” 295 Most importantly, by failing to heed that warning, the law is increasingly harming children who happen to be born into families
that do not conform to the traditional model.
Accordingly, this Part focuses on three facets of Troxel that
courts have wrestled with, noting the degree to which myopia
regarding the American family pervades each and proposing
alternative approaches—ones that better balance the rights of
all involved and create a system that is less discriminatory to
“alternative” family structures. The three facets at issue and
the way in which they have improperly been implemented are:
(1) employing overly narrow definitions of “family” when determining who has standing to petition for rights as a quasiparent, (2) allowing legal parents to wield their own parental
fitness as means to unilaterally terminate the rights of a quasi293. Marc A. Franklin, The Origins and Constitutionality of Limitations on
Truth as a Defense in Tort Law, 16 STAN. L. REV. 789, 798 (1964).
294. See supra notes 26–29 and accompanying text.
295. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 98 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
According to Kennedy, “[a]s we all know, this is simply not the structure or
prevailing condition in many households.” Id.
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parent, and (3) ignoring the legal rights of the child by requiring a high degree of harm in order to safeguard the child’s interest in maintaining a relationship with a quasi-parent.
A. Legal Standing
In Troxel, the Court identified, as one of the more troubling
aspects of the Washington statute, the fact that it permitted
“any person to petition the court for visitation rights.” 296 That
reference by the Court, coupled with its ultimate conclusion
that the statute was unconstitutional as a result of its “sweeping breadth,” 297 has lead a number of states to limit the class of
individuals who may claim quasi-parent status for purposes of
petitioning for visitation rights. In other words, legislatures
have adopted statutes where “only persons with a certain relationship to the child may seek visitation.” 298 New York, for instance, is perhaps the most restrictive in that its statute is expressly limited to “grandparents.” 299
Other states are a bit more permissive, but many nonetheless restrict standing to a fairly limited group of blood relatives. Georgia, for instance, provides that, in certain actions,
“[a]ny family member shall have the right to intervene in and
seek to obtain visitation rights.” 300 However, the statutory
definition of “family member” is limited to “a grandparent,
great-grandparent, or sibling.” 301 Washington is more permissive still but nonetheless excludes a number of individuals.
There, the statute permits a “relative” who has “an ongoing
and substantial relationship with the child” to seek visitation. 302 The statute, in turn, defines “relative” to include blood
relatives and stepparents, among others. 303 Interestingly, the
Washington definition does make provision for “extended fam296. 530 U.S. at 61 (quoting WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.160(3)).
297. Id. at 73.
298. Leslie Joan Harris, Troxel v. Granville: Not the End of Grandparent
Visitation, EXPERIENCE 6, 9 (Spring 2001).
299. See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 72 (2018). In 2017, the New York Assembly
proposed that the law be amended to allow others standing, but even then the
statute would only encompass, in addition to a grandparent, a “relative who is
related to a parent of such child within the second degree of consanguinity or
affinity, residing in this state.” S.B. 7574, 2017 Leg., 240th Sess. (N.Y. 2017).
300. GA. CODE ANN. § 19-7-3 (b)(1)(B) (2018) (emphasis added).
301. Id. at (a)(1).
302. WASH. REV. CODE § 26.001.002 (2018).
303. See WASH. REV. CODE § 26.001.001(2)(a)(i)-(vi).
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ily members” but only for Indian children and, even then, only
to the extent required by the Indian Child Welfare Act. 304
Of course, the justification for limiting the class of third
parties who can petition for visitation is understandable. As
Justice Kennedy noted in his dissent in Troxel, the very act of
having to defend such petitions filed by third parties “can itself
be so disruptive of the parent-child relationship that the constitutional right of a custodial parent to make certain basic determinations for the child’s welfare becomes implicated.”305
Thus, to expand the pool of potential claimants to include too
many people could greatly undermine the rights of legal parents. On the other hand, states have seemingly overlooked the
fact that overly restrictive definitions create a myopic preference for the nuclear family model. As the New York, Georgia,
and Washington statutes illustrate, such statutes fail to contemplate the degree to which “family” might extend beyond
that limited class of individuals.
As discussed earlier, the nuclear family model is not only
on the decline within the United States, it is much less common than the extended family model. 306 Thus, to the extent
states limit their definitions of who can seek visitation, they
are turning a blind eye to the reality of familial structures in
the United States. What is more alarming is the fact that the
extended family model is particularly prevalent in minority
communities within the United States. 307 Accordingly, the
states are adopting standards that will disproportionately
harm people of color. This is true not only of those states that

304. Id. at (2)(a)(vi). Specifically, the statute includes the following within the
definition of “relative”:
Extended family members, as defined by the law or custom of an Indian
child’s tribe or, in the absence of such law or custom, a person who has
reached the age of eighteen and who is the Indian child’s grandparent,
aunt or uncle, brother or sister, brother-in-law or sister-in-law, niece or
nephew, first or second cousin, or stepparent who provides care in the
family abode on a twenty-four hour basis to an Indian child as defined in
25 U.S.C. Sec. 1903(4).
Id.
305. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 101 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
(“Our system must confront more often the reality that litigation can itself be so
disruptive that constitutional protection may be required; and I do not discount
the possibility that in some instances the best interests of the child standard may
provide insufficient protection to the parent-child relationship.”).
306. See supra Section I.A.
307. See supra Section I.B.
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have adopted restrictive statutes but also of those that are unwilling to take seriously claims brought by those outside the
immediate family. After all, within both the African American
and the Hispanic communities in the United States, informal
adoption is quite common and is not limited to only the child’s
closest relatives. 308
To illustrate the harms that can come from treating the
nuclear family as normative, consider the case of O’Neal v.
Wilkes. 309 There, Hattie O’Neal was an African American child
born in 1949 to an unwed mother, who died when O’Neal was
only eight years old. 310 For the next four years, O’Neal would
live in several different households, sometimes headed by relatives and other times not. 311 O’Neal was eventually sent to
Georgia to live with an aunt, who subsequently placed O’Neal
with a married couple, Mr. and Mrs. Roswell Cook, who were
looking to adopt a little girl. 312 Although she was never formally adopted, from the time she went home with the Cooks
until she married in 1975, O’Neal was in all meaningful ways
their “daughter.” 313 After O’Neal left their home and got married, she continued her relationship with the Cooks, who referred to O’Neal’s children as their “grandchildren.” 314 When
Mr. Cook died without a will, O’Neal brought suit, claiming
that she had been “equitably adopted” and, as such, was entitled to inherit from Mr. Cook. 315 The Supreme Court of Georgia
308. See supra Section I.B.
309. 439 S.E.2d 490 (Ga. 1994).
310. Id. at 491. O’Neal was born out of wedlock and “[a]t no time did O’Neal’s
biological father recognize O’Neal as his daughter, take any action to legitimize
her, or provide support to her or her mother.” Id.
311. Id. After living with a maternal aunt in New York City, O’Neal then went
to Savannah, Georgia, where “a woman identified only as Louise who was known
to want a daughter” took her in. Id.
312. Id.
313. Id. (“Although O’Neal was never statutorily adopted by Cook, he raised
her and provided for her education and she resided with him until her marriage in
1975. While she never took the last name of Cook, he referred to her as his
daughter.”).
314. Id.
315. Id. (“The appellee, Firmon Wilkes, was appointed as administrator of
Cook’s estate and refused to recognize O’Neal’s asserted interest in the estate.”).
Equitable adoption permits an individual, who “[a]lthough not adopted with
statutory formalities[,] . . . to maintain a claim in equity to at least some of the
benefits that come with the status of a biological or legally adopted child.” Jan
Ellen Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who Should Get What
and Why (the Impact of Adoptions, Adult Adoptions, and Equitable Adoptions on
Intestate Succession and Class Gifts), 37 VAND. L. REV. 711, 766 (1984).
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refused O’Neal’s claim on the basis that there was no valid
adoption, and thus she failed to qualify as Mr. Cook’s “child.”316
Nowhere in the opinion was it revealed that O’Neal was African American, that the rural Georgia town where she lived
with the Cooks had a mere population of 767, or that there
were no lawyers in that town during the time period in which
O’Neal came to live with the Cooks 317—facts that would have
made the informal nature of Hattie O’Neal’s adoption all the
more understandable. Instead, all the court ever said is that it
“sympathize[s] with O’Neal’s plight.” 318
For many, cases like O’Neal represent a miscarriage of justice resulting from the court’s apparent ignorance about families that do not fall into the nuclear family model. 319 Instead, if
true justice is to be achieved and discrimination on the basis of
familial arrangements avoided, the law must make allowances
for other forms of family structures. The same is true regarding
the legal standards applicable to quasi-parents. After all, in
any case involving the rights of a quasi-parent, one of the key
questions courts must answer is: What kind of person can even
qualify as a quasi-parent? The definition cannot be so limited
that it excludes everyone other than a child’s immediate family. Such a definition would privilege those who more closely
conform to the nuclear family model—a group that tends to exclude a large number of children, especially the children of ethnic minorities living in the United States. 320
Instead, this Article proposes that states adopt a functional approach to identifying quasi-parents. Thus, to the ex316. O’Neal, 439 S.E.2d at 492. Specifically, the court ruled against O’Neal
because the aunt who had placed her lacked “the legal authority to enter into a
contract for her adoption,” a condition precedent to succeeding on a claim of
equitable adoption. Id.
317. JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 99 (7th ed. 2005)
(providing additional facts about the case).
318. O’Neal, 439 S.E.2d at 492.
319. See, e.g., Rebecca C. Bell, Virtual Adoption: The Difficulty of Creating an
Exception to the Statutory Scheme, 29 STETSON L. REV. 415, 422 (1999) (using
O’Neal as an example of “the injustice that may occur when applying the
contractual theory” of equtiable adoption); Danaya C. Wright, Inheritance Equity:
Reforming the Inheritance Penalties Facing Children in Nontraditional Families,
25 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 16 (2015) (“As the dissent in O’Neal v. Wilkes
cogently explains, however, there are many situations where the elements of a
contract are unlikely to exist, as when the biological and adoptive parents have
never met, and where the custody of the child is transferred through the hands of
numerous intermediaries before finally reaching the custodial parent.”).
320. See supra Part I.
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tent states elect to limit the class of individuals who can qualify
as a quasi-parent, the states should do so by looking at how
that person has behaved vis-á-vis the child and not simply the
degree of consanguinity between the individual and the child.
And, indeed, some states have done just that. In a 2006 opinion, for instance, the South Carolina Court of Appeals reversed
a decision of the lower court denying the visitation request of a
cohabiting boyfriend despite the fact he had taken an active
role in the child’s life for ten years. 321 Because South Carolina
did not have a statute that addressed the standing of third parties to seek custody, the court looked to other states, eventually
settling on a four-part test. First, the court looked to whether
“the biological or adoptive parent[s] consented to, and fostered,”
the third party’s relationship with the child. 322 Second, it would
require “that the petitioner and the child lived together in the
same household” and, third, “that the petitioner assumed obligations of parenthood by taking significant responsibility for
the child’s care, education and development, including contributing towards the child’s support, without expectation of financial compensation.” 323 Finally, the court considered the length
of this relationship, focusing on whether the third party occupied “a parental role for a length of time sufficient to have established with the child a bonded, dependent relationship parental in nature. 324 The court identified the last two prongs as
the most important in light of the fact that “they ensure both
that the psychological parent assumed the responsibilities of

321. Middleton v. Johnson, 633 S.E.2d 162, 173 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006). As the
court observed:
As Josh entered elementary school, it was Middleton rather than Mother
who accompanied him to his first day of kindergarten, and it was
Middleton who brought Josh to school almost every morning. . . .
Middleton took Josh to doctor and dentist appointments, and Josh
attended family reunions and functions with Middleton. . . . Josh lived
with Middleton at least half of the week for most of his life [with] Josh
[having] his own room, clothes, and school books in Middleton’s
house. . . . On weekends they would go to movies and visit Frankie’s Fun
Park. On Sundays, Middleton and Josh attended church. [Accordingly,]
Josh spent ten years of his life thinking of Middleton as a father and is
suffering greatly in his absence.
Id. at 170.
322. Id. at 168.
323. Id.
324. Id. at 168 (quoting In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419, 435–36
(Wisc. 1995)).
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parenthood and that there exists a parent-child bond between
the psychological parent and child.” 325
Similarly, in a 2004 case out of the New Jersey Court of
Appeals, a neighbor who had, with the consent of the child’s legal custodian, been “involved in every aspect of [the child’s] life
from four months old to four and one-half years old” qualified
as a quasi-parent. 326 The court held that the neighbor had
standing to petition for custody. 327 Like other state courts that
have awarded rights to quasi-parents, the court was primarily
motivated by the harm that would befall the child should the
relationship be terminated: “At the heart of the psychological
parent cases is a recognition that children have a strong interest in maintaining the ties that connect them to adults who
love and provide for them.” 328
What states must recognize is that a functional standard is
more inclusive and more reflective of the variety of familial
structures in the United States. States should adopt functional
definitions, being ever mindful to ensure that those definitions
do not discriminate against the variety of individuals who can
and frequently do act as quasi-parents.
B. Parental Fitness
In striking down the Washington statute in Troxel, the
Court noted that the law “failed to accord the determination of
[the children’s mother], a fit custodial parent, any material
weight.” 329 As the Court pointed out earlier in the opinion, “so
long as a parent adequately cares for his or her children (i.e., is
fit), there will normally be no reason for the State to . . . question the ability of that parent to make the best decisions concerning the rearing of that parent’s children.” 330 The Court did
not offer any guidance on just how much weight must be given
to the wishes of legal parent, merely noting that the Court
“need not[ ] define today the precise scope of the parental due
325. Id. at 169.
326. P.B. v. T.H., 851 A.2d 780, 790 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004).
327. Id.
328. Id. at 785 (quoting V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 551 (N.J. 2000)); see also
Scott v. Scott, 147 S.W.3d 887, 890 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004) (awarding third-party
custody to the former partner of a biological mother given that “to remove him
from her custody would be detrimental to his welfare”).
329. 530 U.S. 57, 72 (2000).
330. Id. at 68.
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process right in the visitation context.” 331 Thus, state courts
have been left to their own devices when deciding how much
weight to accord the wishes of the child’s legal parent. Not surprisingly, the states have reached vastly different conclusions
on that point.
Most troubling is that some states have effectively allowed
the presence of a fit parent to preclude any claim whatsoever
by a quasi-parent. The Supreme Court of Utah, for instance,
has held that “the common law doctrine of in loco parentis does
not independently grant standing to seek visitation against the
wishes of a fit legal parent.” 332 Further, a fit parent could
terminate another’s status as a quasi-parent at any time: “[A]
legal parent may freely terminate the in loco parentis status by
removing her child from the relationship, thereby extinguishing all parent-like rights and responsibilities vested in the former surrogate parent.” 333 Utah is not alone in expressing such
sentiments. In 2005, Maryland’s highest court held that:
Where the dispute is between a fit parent and a private
third party, [the two] do not begin on equal footing in respect to rights to “care, custody, and control” of the children.
The parent is asserting a fundamental constitutional right.
The third party is not. A private third party has no fundamental constitutional right to raise the children of others.
Generally, absent a constitutional statute, the non-governmental third party has no rights, constitutional or otherwise, to raise someone else’s child. 334

Such a rigid approach fails to recognize the new reality of
the American family. Gone are the days when the nuclear family consisted of a mother, a father, and their legal children. The
increase in divorce, remarriage, and cohabitation as well as the
legalization of same-sex marriage means that an increasing
number of children are being raised in homes headed by adults
who are not the child’s legal parents. 335 Many households—

331. Id. at 73.
332. Jones v. Barlow, 154 P.3d 808, 810 (Utah 2007) (emphasis added).
333. Id. at 813. According to the court: “The in loco parentis status is
‘temporary by definition and ceases on withdrawal of consent by the legal
parent.’” (quoting Carvin v. Britain, 122 P.3d 161, 168 n.7 (Wash. 2005)).
334. McDermott v. Dougherty, 869 A.2d 751, 770 (Md. 2005).
335. See supra Section I.A.
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particularly those in ethnic-minority communities—are
comprised of a number of individuals who may or may not be
related to the child they are helping to parent. 336 Thus, to hold
that a fit legal parent can unilaterally terminate the
relationship between the child and the other adult living in the
child’s home—regardless of how close of a relationship those
two share or how long that relationship has subsisted—not
only exposes those children to the harms associated with the
loss of a quasi-parent, 337 it also discriminates against children
being reared in nontraditional family structures.
To see how harsh this legal regime can be, consider for instance a 2008 Maryland opinion involving two women, Janice
M. and Margaret K., who were in an eighteen-year committed
relationship. 338 While living together, Janice adopted a child,
Maya. 339 Although Margaret did not independently adopt the
child, “the parties shared most duties regarding Maya’s
care.” 340 Janice and Margaret divided the responsibilities for
preparing Maya’s food, changing her diapers, bathing her,
handling her schooling, addressing her healthcare needs, and
performing most other caretaking duties.” 341 The family lived
together for five years until Janice and Margaret separated.342
Even then, Margaret continued to visit the child several times
a week until Janice eventually cut off visitation altogether.343
Margaret responded by bringing suit for custody of Maya or, in
the alternative, visitation. 344 The Maryland court denied
Margaret’s claim.
At the outset, the court identified the issue as “whether, in
a custody or visitation dispute, a third party, non-biological,
non-adoptive parent, who satisfies the test necessary to show
de facto parenthood should be treated differently from other
336. See supra Section I.B.
337. See infra notes 391−393 and accompanying text.
338. Janice M. v. Margaret K., 948 A.2d 73 (Md. 2008) (overruled by Conover v.
Conover, 146 A.3d 433 (Md. 2016)).
339. Id. at 75. The child was adopted from India after Janice M. was unable to
get pregnant using in vitro fertilization.
340. Id. at 76.
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id. (“Margaret K. initially saw Maya between three and four times a week
[until] Janice M. placed certain restrictions on Margaret K.’s visitation . . . .
[Ultimately, Janice would deny] Margaret K. all visitation and prohibit[] her all
access to Maya.”).
344. Id.
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third parties.” 345 The court answered that question in the negative by adopting a rule that, absent exceptional circumstances,
a quasi-parent “must demonstrate . . . that a legal parent is unfit . . . to justify granting that third party visitation rights over
the legal parent’s objections.” 346 Margaret argued that her
qualification as a quasi-parent was sufficient to meet the exceptional circumstances standard, but the court disagreed. 347
Instead, the court held that “while the psychological bond between a child and a third party is a factor in finding exceptional circumstances, it is not determinative.” 348 Accordingly,
the court remanded to the lower court to determine if Margaret
could otherwise satisfy that standard. 349 Importantly, the court
acknowledged that these issues “are not limited to same-sex
couples and could arise in a myriad of other circumstances, including disputes involving step-parents, grandparents, and
parties in a relationship with ‘a significant other.’” 350
Eight years later, the Maryland high court overruled
Janice M. v. Margaret K., recognizing that “gays and lesbians
are particularly ‘ill-served by rigid definitions of parenthood.’” 351 In light of that recognition and the court’s evolution
on the topic of quasi-parenthood, the court’s original decision in
Janice M. provides valuable instruction to other state courts
wrestling with how to weigh parental fitness.
The evolving nuclear family more frequently contains individuals who, despite being neither the child’s biological or
adoptive parent, have functioned as a parent to the child. 352
Because those individuals currently have no constitutional pro345. Id. at 87.
346. Id. at 85. “In other words, where visitation or custody is sought over the
objection of the parent, before the best interest of the child test comes into play,
the de facto parent must establish that the legal parent is either unfit or that
exceptional circumstances exist.” Id. at 87.
347. Id. at 85, 92.
348. Id. at 93.
349. Id.
350. Id. at 88. Nonethless, the court did note that it was “mindful of the
extensive literature in the law reviews on the issue of visitation rights for samesex partners when their relationships have terminated and especially the
difficulties, in some states, that same-sex partners experience when custody or
visitation is at issue.” Id. at 87–88.
351. Conover v. Conover, 146 A.3d 433, 449 (Md. 2016) (quoting Nancy D.
Polikoff, This Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the
Needs of Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO.
L.J. 459, 464 (1990)).
352. See supra Section I.A.
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tections related to parenthood, 353 they are at the mercy of state
law when it comes to preserving any rights to the children they
have parented. If, however, a state continues to preference legal parenthood over all other forms of parentage, those individuals’ rights are now not only at the mercy of the state but
also at the mercy of the legal parent. Two harms ensue from
such a scheme. First, the law fails to reflect the reality of the
changing American family, and second, children who are
reared in such households have less protection for their relationships with those who functioned as their parents.
To avoid such harms and to develop less discriminatory
standards, courts should afford less weight to the fitness of the
legal parent whenever that parent consented to the third party
playing the role of quasi-parent. Some courts have already
adopted such an approach. For example, the North Carolina
Court of Appeals, applying the best interest of the child standard, awarded joint legal and physical custody of a child to the
child’s mother, Irene Dwinnell, and the mother’s former partner, Joellen Mason. 354 Although the mother argued that the
ruling would infringe her constitutional rights to direct the upbringing of her child, the court announced that “when a legal
parent invites a third party into a child’s life, and that invitation alters a child’s life by essentially providing him with another parent, the legal parent’s rights to unilaterally sever that
relationship are necessarily reduced.” 355 Applying that standard, the court ruled that Dwinnell, by encouraging the relationship between her child and Mason, had forfeited her rights
to object to Mason’s claim:
While this case does not involve the biological mother’s
leaving the child in the care of a third person, we still have
the circumstances of Dwinnell’s intentionally creating a
family unit composed of herself, her child and, to use the
Supreme Court’s words, a “de facto parent.” . . . [T]hey all
353. See Jessica Feinberg, Consideration of Genetic Connections in Child
Custody Disputes Between Same-Sex Parents: Fair or Foul?, 81 MO. L. REV. 331,
354 (2016) (noting the assumption by state courts “that constitutional protections
only attach to the legal parent’s relationship with the child and not to the
relationship between a child and an individual entitled to recognition under one of
the equitable parenthood doctrines”).
354. Mason v. Dwinnell, 660 S.E.2d 58, 60 (N.C. Ct. App. 2008).
355. Id. at 69 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Middleton v. Johnson, 633 S.E.2d
162, 169 (S.C. Ct. App. 2006)).
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lived together as a family and Dwinnell led her child to believe that Mason was one of his parents. Even though
Dwinnell did not completely relinquish custody, she fully
shared it with Mason, including sharing decision-making,
caretaking, and financial responsibilities for the child.
And . . . Dwinnell intended—during the creation of this
family unit—that this parent-like relationship would be
permanent, such that she “induced [Mason and the child] to
allow that family unit to flourish in a relationship of love
and duty with no expectations that it would be terminated.”
Ultimately . . . Mason and the child forged a strong parentchild bond. 356

The court described Dwinnell’s attempt to sever the relationship between the child and Mason as having the potential to
“tear the heart of the child, and mar his happiness.” 357
North Carolina is not the only state to rule that even a fit
parent may have limited ability to object to the claims of a
quasi-parent if the parent consented to that relationship. 358
Even Justice Kennedy in his Troxel dissent suggested such an
approach when he noted that “a fit parent’s right vis-á-vis a
complete stranger is one thing; her right vis-á-vis another parent or a de facto parent may be another.” 359 Some courts have
refused to follow this approach because the “fundamental”
rights of parents implies the application of strict scrutiny,360
but, as discussed earlier, the Supreme Court has never stated
that strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard nor has it applied anything approaching strict scrutiny in cases dealing
with parental rights. 361
Interestingly, the American Law Institute has offered a
different solution to this problem—it simply redefined “parent”
to encompass a broader array of parent-child relationships. In
356. Id. at 68–69.
357. Id. at 71 (quoting In re Gibbons, 101 S.E.2d 16, 22 (N.C. 1957)).
358. See, e.g., V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 552 (N.J. 2000) (“That parent has
the absolute ability to maintain a zone of autonomous privacy for herself and her
child. However, if she wishes to maintain that zone of privacy she cannot invite a
third party to function as a parent to her child and cannot cede over to that third
party parental authority the exercise of which may create a profound bond with
the child.”); Middleton, 633 S.E.2d at 169.
359. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 102 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
360. See Beardsley v. Garcia, 731 N.W.2d 843, 851 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007).
361. See supra notes 254–264 and accompanying text.
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its 2002 Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 362 the ALI
attempted to determine “how the law should respond to
changes in family forms over the last half century.” 363 In response, the Principles recognize three categories of parentage. 364 In addition to the traditional category of legal parenthood, 365 the Principles propose two additional categories—
parenthood by estoppel and de facto parenthood. 366 A parent by
estoppel is one who lived with the child for at least two years
with the permission of the child’s legal parent and assumed
“full and permanent responsibilities as a parent.” 367 In contrast, a de facto parent is one who lived with the child and
voluntarily performed caretaking functions equal to the “parent
with whom the child primarily lived” for at least two years,
either as a result of an agreement with the legal parent or
because of that parent’s “complete failure or inability . . . to
perform caretaking functions.” 368 A parent by estoppel is afforded all the same rights and responsibilities as a legal parent, 369 while a de facto parent holds a secondary status—one
that, despite “being entitled to preserve established parenting
roles alongside the child’s other parents,” 370 is not afforded the
same rights as a legal parent or a parent by estoppel. 371 For instance, the Principles prohibit courts from awarding de facto

362. AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2002) [hereinafter PRINCIPLES].
363. Michael R. Clisham & Robin Fretwell Wilson, American Law Institute’s
Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, Eight Years After Adoption: Guiding
Principles or Obligatory Footnote?, 42 FAM. L.Q. 573, 573 (2008).
364. PRINCIPLES, supra note 362, § 2.03(1)(a)–(c).
365. Id. § 2.03(1)(a) (referring to those currently classified—typically via a
biological relationship or through formal adoption—as a parent under state law).
366. Id. § 2.03(1)(b)–(c).
367. Id. § 2.03(1)(b). For children less than two years of age, the person need
only have lived with the child and assumed those responsibilities since the child’s
birth. Id.
368. Id. § 2.03(1)(c).
369. See Melanie B. Jacobs, Why Just Two? Disaggregating Traditional
Parental Rights and Responsibilities to Recognize Multiple Parents, 9 J. L. & FAM.
STUD. 309, 335 (2007) (“Under the ALI Principles, parents by estoppel have rights
equivalent to those of legal parents.”); Meyer, supra note 55, at 51 (“Thus, in a
custody dispute between an adoptive parent and a parent by estoppel, neither
would enjoy any legal preference over the other.”).
370. Meyer, supra note 55, at 51.
371. Feinberg, supra note 353, at 353 n.118 (“The ALI Principles recognize
parents by estoppel, but not de facto parents, as standing on equal footing to legal
parents in the custody context.”).
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parents “the majority of custodial responsibility” if a legal parent or a parent by estoppel objects. 372
Although the ALI’s expansive definition of parenthood has
proven controversial, 373 “several states have begun to move
tentatively in that direction.” 374 Maryland, for example, relied
on the Principles in the opinion that overruled Janice M. They
were just one example of the growing “decisional and statutory
law of other jurisdictions” that prompted the court to “recognize
de facto parenthood.” 375 Similarly, the Supreme Court of Rhode
Island ruled that a de facto parent could seek visitation, noting
“that our position here is in harmony with the principles recently adopted by the American Law Institute.” 376
While no jurisdiction has explicitly adopted the ALI’s approach, more and more courts will likely face situations requiring them to decide when legal strangers can claim parental
rights. Regardless of whether states adopt an approach like the
one suggested by the ALI or merely limit a legal parent’s ability to use parental fitness to automatically evict a quasi-parent
from a child’s life, the states must recognize that any approach
that values a legal parent’s wishes above all else will pose a

372. See PRINCIPLES, supra note 362, § 2.18(1)(a); see also id. § 2.09 (entitling
legal parents and parents by estoppel, but not de facto parents, to a presumption
of decision-making authority).
373. See, e.g., Buss, supra note 8, at 643 (“The ALI’s custody scheme . . . is
problematic in several interrelated respects.”); Wilson, supra note 69, at 93
(criticizing the ALI’s “ballooning definition of parent”); see also, Julie Shapiro, De
Facto Parents and the Unfulfilled Promise of the New ALI Principles, 35
WILLAMETTE L. REV. 769, 774 (1999) (noting that “a review of the critical
provisions relating to nonlegal parents suggests that the ALI’s improvements are
largely illusory”); Linda C. McClain, Love, Marriage, and the Baby Carriage:
Revisiting the Channelling Function of Family Law, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 2133,
2176 (2007) (noting how “the ALI Principles have drawn criticism for proposing to
recognize certain categories of nonbiological parenthood”).
374. See Meyer, supra note 55, at 51.
375. Conover v. Conover, 146 A.3d 433, 451 (Md. 2016) (overruling Janice M. v.
Margaret K., 948 A.2d 73 (2008)).
376. Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 975 (R.I. 2000) (“There, the ALI has
recognized that individuals who have been significantly involved in caring for and
supporting children and for whom they have acted as parents may obtain legal
recognition of their parental rights to visitation and custody.”); see also E.N.O. v.
L.M.M., 711 N.E.2d 886, 891 (Mass. 1999) (citing the Principles in support of the
court’s decision to treat a biological mother’s former partner as a de facto parent
and thus award visitation). But see LP v. LF, 338 P.3d 908, 921 (Wyo. 2014)
(discussing the ALI Principles but ultimately “declin[ing] to adopt de facto
parentage or parentage by estoppel, instead leaving that important policy decision
to the Wyoming Legislature”).
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great risk to families that do not conform to the outdated nuclear family model.
C. Harm to the Child
Despite the fact that Troxel did not address “whether the
Due Process Clause requires all nonparental visitation statutes
to include a showing of harm or potential harm to the child as a
condition precedent to granting visitation,” 377 many courts
have required quasi-parents to make that very showing. 378 Indeed, when courts award parental rights to quasi-parents, they
do so primarily on the basis that “children have a strong interest in maintaining the ties that connect them to adults who
love and provide for them.” 379 For instance, in Scott v. Scott, a
Missouri court gave custody of a child to the mother’s former
partner. 380 There, Renae Scott filed for a divorce from her husband, Donald. 381 The two had one child, Danton. Renae and
Donald had actually separated six years earlier and, during
that time, Renae had had a short-lived relationship with a
woman, Janice. 382 When the relationship between the Renae
and Janice ended, Renae moved to another city to begin a new
relationship with another woman. 383 However, wanting to “test
out” the relationship before relocating her son, Renae left Danton in the care of Janice. 384 In looking at Janice’s relationship
with the child, the court found:

377. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 73 (2000).
378. See, e.g., Patten v. Ardis, 816 S.E.2d 633, 637 (Ga. 2018) (striking down
Georgia’s statute, entitled “Grant of visitation rights to family members” because
“it authorizes an award of visitation . . . over the objection of a fit parent and
without any showing whatsoever (much less a showing by clear and convincing
evidence) that the visitation is required to keep the child from actual or
threatened harm”).
379. V.C. v. M.J.B., 748 A.2d 539, 551 (N.J. 2000); see also Susan Frelich
Appleton, Parents by the Numbers, 37 HOFSTRA L. REV. 11, 28 (2008) (describing
“the concept of ‘psychological parent,’ as . . . [based on] the harm that the child
would experience if an ongoing relationship with an adult whom he or she
regarded as a parent were disrupted, regardless of that adult’s official status with
respect to the child”).
380. 147 S.W.3d 887 (Mo. App. 2004).
381. Id. at 890.
382. Id.
383. Id.
384. Id. During that time, Renae “failed to maintain any sort of consistent
contact with Danton, often failing to show up for scheduled visits.” Id. at 890–91.
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[S]he had, at the time of trial, been caring exclusively for
Danton from August of 1999, when the appellant moved to
Sedalia to live with her new girlfriend. During this time
Danton had developed both mentally and physically as expected and appeared to be a normal, well-adjusted young
man. In addition, Danton testified that he did not want to
live with the appellant and that he thought of [Janice] as
his mother. 385

When Renae subsequently brought suit to regain permanent
custody of Danton, the court refused and instead awarded custody to Janice. It did so by focusing on the harm that would befall Danton were the court to rule otherwise: “Danton had
bonded with [Janice] such that to remove him from her custody
would be detrimental to his welfare.” 386
Thus, courts that award parental rights to quasi-parents
frequently do so based on the child’s interest in maintaining
that relationship, and not on the basis of the quasi-parent’s
rights. 387 As Professor Solangel Maldonado explains: “State
legislatures did not enact third party visitation statutes for the
benefit of third parties, but rather because legislators believed
that, under certain circumstances, it is in the child’s best interest to maintain relationships with third parties even over their
parents’ objections.” 388 In some states the harm must be quite
severe before the state will grant rights to a quasi-parent. The
Supreme Court of Connecticut, for instance, held that a quasiparent can only justify state interference with the rights of the
child’s legal parent(s) if the quasi-parent can prove that the
child will otherwise “suffer real and substantial emotional
harm.” 389 The court described the requisite level of harm as

385. Id. at 897.
386. Id. at 896.
387. See Meyer, supra note 55, at 50 (“[C]ourts have carved out a role for these
care givers based on the rationale that the state’s interest in protecting children
from emotional harm is sufficiently strong to overcome parental rights.”).
388. Maldonado, supra note 24, at 891.
389. Roth v. Weston, 789 A.2d 431, 445 (Conn. 2002); see also Dara v. Gish, 404
P.3d 154, 161 (Alaska 2017) (“Once standing is established, a third party seeking
custody must show by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is unfit or
that the welfare of the child requires the child to be in the custody of the nonparent.” (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted)).
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“akin to the level of harm that would allow the state to assume
custody under [state laws dealing with neglected children].” 390
Although certainly understandable (and perhaps even laudatory) that states would require some justification before disregarding the wishes of a child’s legal parent, the courts’ focus
has been overly narrow. For one thing, courts must be mindful
that setting too high of a burden for showing harm ignores the
reality of just how damaging it can be to children to have a
quasi-parent removed from their life. As one court noted, “emotional harm to a young child is intrinsic in the termination or
significant curtailment of the child’s relationship with a psychological parent under any definition of that term.” 391 And the
harm can be quite severe. As Professor Jessica Feinberg recently summarized:
The disruption of attachment relationships can cause significant both short- and long-term psychological and emotional harm to children. For example, when the relationship
between an infant or toddler and psychological parent is
disrupted, the child suffers anxiety and separation distress,
and may have difficulty trusting the individuals with whom
they form relationships in the future. . . . Disruption of attachment relationships during childhood also can lead to
“aggression, fearful relationships, academic problems in
school and . . . elevated psychopathology,” and disruption
experienced during childhood may continue to affect an individual even during adulthood. 392

Not only is it harmful to terminate those relationships, but
“[s]tudies have repeatedly shown that children derive significant benefits from continued contact with third parties who
have functioned as parents.” 393 Given the states’ parens patriae
responsibility “to safeguard the present and future welfare of
390. Roth, 789 A.2d at 445.
391. In re E.L.M.C., 100 P.3d 546, 561 (Colo. App. 2004).
392. Jessica Feinberg, Whither the Functional Parent? Revisiting Equitable
Parenthood Doctrines in Light of Same-Sex Parents’ Increased Access to Obtaining
Formal Legal Parent Status, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 55, 65–66 (2017); Rebecca L.
Scharf, Psychological Parentage, Troxel, and the Best Interests of the Child, 13
GEO. J. GENDER & L. 615, 617 (2012) (exploring the “many ways children are
harmed by the law’s failure to ensure that the bonds they have developed with
their psychological parents are not broken”).
393. Maldonado, supra note 24, at 892.
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children,” 394 state legislators and courts must take into account
the true extent of the harms associated with removing a quasiparent from the daily life of a child. Finally, states need to be
mindful that losing a quasi-parent might pose even greater
harm to children who reside in extended family structures because of the greater closeness they share with individuals who
are not their legal parents. Consider for instance what one
scholar observed when studying the extended family model in
the Mexican American community: “[I]t is important to see relatives regularly face-to-face, to embrace, to touch, and to simply be with one another, sharing the minor joys and sorrows of
daily life.” 395 In contrast, when it came to white families, “these
things are integral to nuclear family life but less important
with regard to extended family ties.” 396
Of perhaps greater consequence is that by focusing exclusively on demonstrated harm, the courts are ignoring the question of whether children have a constitutional right to maintain
a relationship with a quasi-parent. After all, there is no question that children enjoy constitutional rights. More than fifty
years ago the Supreme Court declared that “neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.” 397
The Court has made clear that “Constitutional rights do not
mature and come into being magically only when one attains
the state-defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are
protected by the Constitution and possess constitutional
rights.” 398
The precise scope of those rights, however, is far from certain. Indeed, a plurality of the Court in Michael H. v. Gerald D.
noted that “[w]e have never had occasion to decide whether a
child has a liberty interest, symmetrical with that of her parent, in maintaining her filial relationship.” 399 Eleven years lat-

394. Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical Perspective, 22
STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1218 (1970); see also SHULMAN, supra note 29, at 56 (“As
parens-patriae, the state has plenary power to legislate on behalf of the child. The
interest of the state in its children is so broad ‘as to almost defy limitations.’”
(quoting In re Lippincott, 124 A. 532, 533 (N.J. Ch. 1924))).
395. Susan Emley Keefe, Real and Ideal Extended Familism Among Mexican
Americans and Anglo Americans: On the Meaning of “Close” Family Ties, 43 HUM.
ORG. 65, 68 (1984).
396. Id.
397. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13 (1967).
398. Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976).
399. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 130 (1989).
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er, Justice Stevens penned a dissent in Troxel in which he posited that “it seems to me extremely likely that, to the extent
parents and families have fundamental liberty interests in preserving such intimate relationships, so, too, do children have
these interests, and so, too, must their interests be balanced in
the equation.” 400 It is the position of this Article that Justice
Stevens is correct.
A persuasive analogy can be found in the Court’s treatment of illegitimacy. Historically, nonmarital children were
viewed as having no legal parents. Considered “filius nullius,”
or “the child of no one,” illegitimate children had no legal relationship to either parent. 401 Starting in the late 1960s, however, the Supreme Court began striking down laws that discriminated against nonmarital children. The first case to do so
was Levy v. Louisiana, in which the Court struck down a Louisiana statute that prevented nonmarital children from bringing
an action for the wrongful death of their mother. 402 Using the
Equal Protection Clause, the Court concluded that “it is invidious to discriminate against [nonmarital children] when no action, conduct, or demeanor of theirs is possibly relevant to the
harm that was done their mother.” 403 Importantly, in a companion case, Glona v. American Guarantee & Liability Insurance Co., the Court held that it was likewise unconstitutional to prevent a biological parent from suing for the
wrongful death of a nonmarital child. 404 Thus, the right was reciprocal, with parent and child both qualifying as right-holders.
Of course, in those cases—and indeed in all cases concerning parental rights decided by the Supreme Court—the
parent in question was not a quasi-parent but the legal parent.
Although adults may have recourse to attain the status of legal
parenthood over a child in their care, the child has no such
power to compel an adoption and is instead at the mercy of
400. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 86 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
401. See Dorothy Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 253 (1995).
As John Dewey explains, “it was not understood to deny the fact of physiological
begetting; it was asserting that such a one did not possess the specific rights
which belong to one who was filius, implying wedlock as a legal institution.” John
Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality, 35 YALE L.J. 655,
656 (1926).
402. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
403. Id. at 72. Notably, the Court reached this result despite the fact that the
law at issue “had history and tradition on its side.” Id. at 71.
404. Id. at 73.
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those adults who have stepped up to raise the child. 405 Further,
it is not as though the child can simply strike out in search of
parents who will adopt. As one commentator said when discussing the inheritance rights of informally adopted children:
“It seems safe to assume that most children, even if they knew
of their lack of status, would remain in the foster home and
continue to act as dutiful children simply because they would
have no other viable option.” 406
Whatever protections flow to legal parents by virtue of the
Constitution should likewise flow to children, safeguarding
their relationships with both legal and quasi-parents. As one
commentator has pointed out, “[w]hile courts have afforded
children’s constitutional rights only limited protection in comparison to adults, they usually restricted children’s rights to
preserve the corresponding rights of the adults who take care
of them or to promote the children’s best interests.” 407 Thus,
when someone other than the parent is caring for the child, the
usual limitations on the child’s rights vis-á-vis the legal parent
should go away, and the child’s best interest should become the
paramount consideration. At any rate, more guidance is needed
from the Supreme Court regarding the nature of a child’s right
to maintain relationships with parental figures. It could be that
state courts’ current focus on psychological harm is too narrow
and should also take into account the harm these situations
pose to the constitutional rights of the child.
Regardless, states are failing to fully protect the child
when they focus primarily on the rights of legal parents or only
consider the child’s interest when the threat of harm is quite
high. The focus should instead be the child’s rights in maintaining the relationship in question. Or, as one court put it
many years ago: The question is “not what are the rights of the
father or the other relative to the custody of the child, or
whether the right of the one be superior to that to the other,
but what are the rights of the child?” 408 States that fail to take
405. See, e.g., O’Neal v. Wilkes, 439 S.E.2d 490, 494 (Ga. 1994) (Sears-Collins,
J., dissenting) (“[A] child is usually too young to know of or understand the
contract [to adopt], and it is thus difficult to find a meeting of the minds between
the child and the adopting parents and the child’s acceptance of the contract.”).
406. Rein, supra note 315, at 776.
407. Gilbert A. Holmes, The Tie That Binds: The Constitutional Right of
Children to Maintain Relationships with Parent-Like Individuals, 53 MD. L. REV.
358, 386 (1994).
408. Merritt v. Swimley, 82 Va. 433, 440 (Va. 1886).
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into account the child’s best interest are likely creating laws
that are, to put it mildly, short sighted. If courts fail to strike
the proper balance, then we risk creating a system that exposes
children to the very harms that state courts, acting as parens
patriae, are intended to shield children from.
The legal question of how to adjudicate claims by quasiparents is an incredibly complicated one—it will no doubt take
years to reach a solid consensus on how to best balance all the
competing interests. As a threshold matter, it seems quite clear
that children cannot be discriminated against based on the
family structures in which they were reared. As the Supreme
Court has recognized, such discrimination “makes it even more
difficult for the children to understand the integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with other families in
their community and in their daily lives.” 409 Unfortunately, as
states have struggled to give effect to the Court’s holding in
Troxel, they have lost sight of the fact that children are increasingly less likely to come from the sort of family contemplated by the standards relating to quasi-parenthood that have
evolved post-Troxel. The suggestions above are intended to help
right that ship so that future developments in quasiparenthood law can be built on a less discriminatory foundation.
CONCLUSION
Justice O’Connor, writing for the plurality in Troxel v.
Granville, observed that “[t]he demographic changes of the past
century make it difficult to speak of an average American family.” 410 It is somewhat ironic then, that in the twenty years after Troxel, state courts have relied on that very opinion—the
only opinion in which the Supreme Court has ever addressed
the rights of parents vis-á-vis third parties—to adopt standards
that treat the traditional nuclear family model as normative.
That model, quite simply, is at odds with the reality of the
American family. Indeed, throughout much of this country’s
history, many families have organized themselves into larger,
more diverse family units. That is particularly true of the eth409. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 772 (2013).
410. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000). Later, she also observed that
“persons outside the nuclear family are called upon with increasing frequency to
assist in the everyday tasks of child rearing.” Id. at 64.
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nic minorities living in this country. It is bad enough that the
law of domestic relations has largely ignored those family
structures, but now this myopia has extended beyond those
communities. With the legalization of same-sex marriage and
the greater incidences of divorce, remarriage, and cohabitation,
even the contemporary nuclear family looks much different today than it did when Troxel was decided—so much so that
many more families will find themselves unprotected by laws
that presume a traditional nuclear family model.
Discrimination of this variety exists in a number of laws
dealing with domestic relations. Nonetheless, familial discrimination is particularly pernicious in legal regimes involving
quasi-parenthood because the respective rights of the adults in
a child’s life are the law’s exclusive focus, so the risk of harm to
the child is a secondary concern or irrelevant altogether. And,
as noted earlier, the harms that follow a forced separation from
one who has behaved as the child’s parent are well documented
and serious—concerns about these harms are the driving force
behind legal regimes that recognize the claims of quasiparents. 411 Understandably, given the lack of guidance from
the Supreme Court, the law on this issue will evolve as state
courts continue to decide how best to structure the legal framework for quasi-parenthood. As a first step, the states must recognize the multiplicity of family forms that exist in the United
States. As one court, writing back in 1993, correctly recognized:
It is not the courts that have engendered the diverse composition of today’s families. It is the advancement of reproductive technologies and society’s recognition of alternative
lifestyles that have produced families in which a biological,
and therefore a legal, connection is no longer the sole organizing principle. But it is the courts that are required to
define, declare and protect the rights of children raised in
these families. . . . 412

Thus far the states have by and large failed to do that, and if
the states do not correct their error, countless children—in particular the children of ethnic and sexual minorities—will continue to pay the price.

411.
412.

Roth v. Weston, 789 A.2d 431, 445 (Conn. 2002).
In re Adoption of B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1276 (Vt. 1993).
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